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THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT AND THE AFTERMATH
OF THE CIVIL WAR
L. Scott Stafford*
The Civil War settled two legal issues that had loomed over the
people of Arkansas since before the state's admission to the Union in
1836. The war ended slavery in the state. On January 1, 1863,
President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive proclamation freeing
slaves in Arkansas and the other ten Confederate states.' Although
federal authority in January of 1863 extended only to the northern half
of the state, where there were relatively few slaves, any doubt regarding
the legality of slavery was resolved in March of 1864 by the adoption
of the Arkansas Constitution of 1864, which expressly abolished slavery
throughout the state.2
The second great legal issue that was settled by the war was the
state's relationship to the national government that it had joined in 1836.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century state's rights
advocates had asserted that the United States was formed by the states,
not by individual citizens of the states. From this premise they had
argued that each state, acting through it citizens, retained the right to
sever its relationship with the Union. The people of Arkansas attempted
to exercise this right in May of 1861 when a convention of specially
elected delegates voted overwhelmingly in favor of secession.' The
defeat of the Confederacy clearly established that a majority of a state's
citizens lacked the power to withdraw that state from the United States.
Although the Civil War settled the questions of slavery and
secession, it created new, albeit more prosaic, legal questions for
Arkansans. Among the most troublesome were four questions that
repeatedly reached the Supreme Court of Arkansas during the years
immediately following the Civil War:
1. What was the legal effect of orders and decisions rendered by
the courts of the state during the period that the state was a part of the
Confederacy?
* Professor of.Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School (1971). The author gratefully acknowledges
the contributions of J.W. "Jake" Looney, former dean of the University of Arkansas
School of Law, whose unpublished manuscript on the history ofthe Arkansas Supreme
Court examines many of the cases discussed in this article.
I. See Exec. Proclamation No. 17 (1863), reprinted in 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
2. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. V.
3. See JOURNAL OF BOTH SESSIONS, THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS,
WHICH WERE BEGUN AND HELD IN THE CAPITOL, INTHECITY OF LITTLE ROCK 121-24 (186 1)
[hereinafter JOURNAL OF BOTH SESSIONS].
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2. What were the rights of parties to a contract calling for payment
in Confederate dollars, now a valueless currency?
3. Did the war toll the statute of limitations on enforcement of
contracts and collection of debts?
4. Was a promise to pay for slaves legally enforceable after
emancipation?
The court was forced to confront these politically charged issues
during one of the most turbulent periods in Arkansas history. The
political differences that led to the Civil War did not disappear with the
defeat of the Confederacy. They survived and continued to drive
political debate during the postwar years. Between 1865 and 1874, the
state operated under three different constitutions, and there were three
wholesale replacements of thejustices who served on the supreme court.
Because the postwarjustices came from very different backgrounds, this
political instability had an effect on the deliberations of the supreme
court. Consequently, a discussion of the court's response to the legal
issues produced by the war must be prefaced by brief portraits of the
justices who served on the court during the decade following the war.
1. THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE POSTBELLUM PERIOD
By the fall of 1863 Union forces had conquered the northern half
of Arkansas, including the state capital at Little Rock. In September of
1863 the Confederate state government retreated to the town of
Washington in southwest Arkansas, where a government-in-exile
managed to function for the final twenty months of the war. The
Confederate state supreme court never addressed the legal questions
produced by the defeat of the Confederacy because it passed out of
existence with that defeat.
A. The Unionist Supreme Court of 1864-66
In early 1864 Arkansans loyal to the United States government met
in Little Rock and drafted a new state constitution which voters in
Union-occupied Arkansas approved on March 14, 1864.4 At the same
election in which they approved the new constitution, voters elected a
complete slate of state officials including three justices of the supreme
4. See ARK. CONST. of 1864. See also JOURNALOFTHECONVENTIONOF DELEGATESOF
THE PEOPLEOFARKANSASASSEMBLEDATTHECAPITOL, JANUARY 4, 864 (1870) [hereinafter
JOURNAL OF THE 1864 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
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court.5 When the Confederate state government collapsed in the spring
of 1865, the Unionist government became the state's sole government.
The three Unionist justices elected in 1864 under the Constitution of
1864 never considered the legal issues produced by the abolition of
slavery or the repudiation of secession. Although the justices took
office in June of 1864, they did not hear their first appeal until the
December 1865 term, almost eighteen months after the court's forma-
tion and seven months after the war's end. Ironically, the very first
opinion issued by the Unionist supreme court led to the demise of the
Unionist state government that included the court.
The case, Rison v. Farr,6 involved the qualifications of electors. The
Constitution of 1864 provided that all white males who were at least 21
years of age and had been citizens of the state for six months were
entitled to vote in an election.7 On May 31, 1864, the newly elected
Unionist General Assembly passed a statute imposing an additional
requirement. Each prospective voter had to take an oath that he had not
voluntarily borne arms against the United States or the state of Arkan-
sas, or aided the Confederacy after April 18, 1 864.! Since the Civil War
continued for almost a year after April 18, 1864, the effect of the
legislation was to disenfranchise many diehard supporters of the
Confederacy. In Rison v. Farr the Unionist supreme court struck down
the test oath as an unconstitutional legislative attempt to alter the voter
qualifications prescribed by the constitution.
B. The Conservative Supreme Court of 1866-67
The court's invalidation of the test oath made it possible for former
Confederates to recapture control of state government at the August
1866 general election. Neither side used traditional party labels during
that election. To avoid identification with the prewar Democratic Party,
ex-Confederates ran on a "Conservative" ticket. Supporters of the
incumbent government preferred to use the ballot label "Unionist" since
the national Republican Party was still unpopular with many Arkansas
voters.9 Conservatives swept the 1866 election. They won all contested
state offices, including the three positions on the supreme court, and
5. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, sched., § 7.
6. 24 Ark. 161 (December Term 1865).
7. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 2.
8. See Act 17 of the 15th Ark. General Assembly, 1864-65 Ark. Acts 48, § 6.
9. See THOMAS S. STAPLES, RECONSTRUCTION IN ARKANSAS, 1862-1874, at 101 (Peter
Smith ed. 1964) (1923).
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gained control of both houses of the General Assembly. The only
Unionist officeholders to survive were those state officers, including
Governor Isaac Murphy, whose terms were not up until 1868.'0
The three justices elected to the supreme court in August of 1866
had impeccable Confederate credentials. The new chief justice was
David W. Walker, who five years earlier had presided over the
convention that voted to withdraw Arkansas from the Union. Walker
was born in Kentucky in 1806 and came to Fayetteville about 1830."
Within a very few years he had achieved sufficient prominence to be
selected a delegate to the convention that drafted the Constitution of
1836, and four years later he was elected to represent Washington
County in the state senate.'2 He was the Whig candidate for Congress
in 1844 but was easily defeated by Archibald Yell, the state's popular
governor who resigned to run for the seat. 3 Walker served as associate
justice of the supreme court from 1849 to 1855 4 but was back in private
practice in Fayetteville at the time of his election to the 1861 conven-
tion. Like many Arkansas Whigs Walker was a reluctant secessionist,
but he ably served the Confederate cause once Arkansas left the Union.
In 1863 he was commissioned a colonel in the Confederate Army and
appointed to the state Military Court,'5 where there were unconfirmed
reports that he ordered the execution of Confederate deserters and
mutinous conscripts.'6 Due to his substantial wealth, Walker was
ineligible for the general amnesty proclaimed by President Andrew
Johnson in May of 1865,"7 but with the endorsement of Unionist
Governor Isaac Murphy as well as the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, Walker received an individual pardon from
10. See id. at 109. See also ARK. GAzErE, Sept. I, 1866, at I (weekly ed.).
i1. See 2 PUBLICATIONS OF THE ARK. HIST. Assoc. 264-65 (1908).
12. See ARK. SECRETARY OF STATE. HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
328 (1986).
13. See id. at 213.
14. Seeid. at451.
15. See ARK. GAZETrE, July 4, 1863, at 1.
16. See MICHAEL B. DOUGAN, CONFEDERATE ARKANSAS-THE PEOPLE AND POLICIES
OF A FRONTIER STATE IN WARTIME 125 (1976).
17. Johnson's general amnesty proclamation excepted all persons who had
voluntarily participated in the rebellion and whose taxable property exceeded $20,000.
See Exec. Proclamation No. 37, § 13 (1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 758 (1863-65).
According to the 1850 census, Walker owned real property valued at $27,322 and 20
slaves. See Robert B. Walz, Arkansas Slaveholdings and Slaveholders in 1850, 12 ARK.
HIST.Q. 38 (1953).
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the president.' 8 Shortly thereafter he completed his rehabilitation by
winning election to the state's top judicial post.
John J. Clendenin also won election to the supreme court in August
of 1866. Clendenin was born in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1812. He
came to Arkansas in 1836, the year it achieved statehood, and became
private secretary to James S. Conway, the state's first governor. In 1840
the General Assembly elected Clendeninjudge of the fifth circuit court
(Hot Spring, Monroe, Pulaski, Saline, and White counties) 9 and re-
elected him to another four year term in 1844, but he resigned in 1846,
midway through his second term, to take a post as quartermaster with
the United States Army. By 1848 he had quit his army post and was
back in Little Rock practicing law with his brother-in-law, George C.
Watkins. In 1849 he replaced Watkins as state's attorney for the fifth
circuit, which under the Constitution of 1836 made him ex-officio the
attorney general of the state." In 1854 he returned to the bench as judge
of the fifth circuit court, a post which he still held when Federal troops
marched into Little Rock in September of 1863. Clendenin apparently
followed the Confederate state government to the temporary state capital
in southwest Arkansas because in May of 1865 Confederate Governor
Harris Flanagin sent Clendenin to Little Rock in an unsuccessful attempt
to negotiate peace terms with the commander of Union forces in the
state.22 Clendenin was ineligible for President Johnson's general
amnesty because of a pending federal lawsuit to confiscate his property,
but like Walker, he received an individual pardon from President
Johnson.'
The third justice elected to the supreme court in August of 1866
was Freeman W. Compton, who until the collapse of the Confederate
state government in the spring of 1865 had served on the Confederate
state supreme court. Compton was born in North Carolina in 1824 and
practiced law for several years in Greeneville, Tennessee, before
18. See Richard B. McCaslin, Reconstructing a Frontier Oligarchy: Andrew Johnson 's
Amnesty Proclamation and Arkansas, 49 ARK. HIST. Q. 323-24 (1990).
19. See Act of Dec. 14, 1838, 1838-39 Ark. Acts 4.
20. See ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VI, § 13.
21. Except as otherwise indicated, the biographical information regarding
Clendenin is taken from I JOHN HALLUM, BIOGRAPHICAL AND PICTORIAL HISTORY OF
ARKANSAS 274-75 (1887). See also Death of Judge Clendenin, ARK. GAZETTE, July 6,
1874, at 1.
22. Clendenin's mission and the Federal response are described in a May 27, 1865
letter from Maj. Gen. J.J. Reynolds to the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army, reprinted
in 48 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OFTHE OFFICIAL RECORDS OFTE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, No. I, pt. II at 626 (1896) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS].
23. See McCaslin, supra note 18, at 322 n.26.
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moving to Arkansas in 1849. He purchased a plantation near Princeton
in Dallas County and became a successful planter and lawyer.2 4 In
February of 1859 the General Assembly elected Compton justice of the
supreme court, and he served in that position throughout the war years.2
The Conservative supreme court met only three terms-December
of 1866, June of 1867, and December of 1867. It ceased to exist as a
result of the Reconstruction Acts passed by Congress in 1867. These
three acts placed Arkansas under military rule and conditioned the
state's readmission to the Union on voter approval of a new constitution
acceptable to Congress. 6 In November of 1867 Arkansas voters elected
delegates to a constitutional convention which convened in Little Rock
in early 1868 and drafted a new constitution.2" The schedule to the
proposed constitution provided for the offices created by the document
to be filled at the same election.28 By now three groups-recent
immigrants from the north, native Unionists, and newly freed
slaves-had coalesced to form the Arkansas Republican Party, and the
party nominated a complete slate of candidates for the offices created by
the proposed constitution. Congressional franchise restrictions barred
or discouraged voting by many former Confederates. Those opponents
of Congressional reconstruction who were eligible to vote did not
nominate candidates for office and instead focused their efforts on
defeating the proposed constitution.29 At an election held on March 13,
1868, voters approved the proposed constitution by a narrow margin."
24. See HALLUM. supra note 2 1, at 318-20; 2 FAY HEMPSTEAD, HISTORICAL REVIEW
OF ARKANSAS 455-56 (1911); Judge Compton, ARK. GAZETTE, May 30, 1893, at 3.
25. See ARK. SENATE JOURNALat 498 (1859).
26. See Act of July 19, 1867, 15 Stat. 14(1869); Act of March 23, 1867, 15 Stat.
2 (1869); Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 428 (1868).
27. See DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION WHICH ASSEMBLED AT LITTLE
ROCK, JANUARY 7, 1868, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 2ND,
1867, AND THE ACTS OF MARCH 23RD AND JULY 19TH, SUPPLEMENTARY THERETO, TO FORM
ACONSTITUTION FORTHE STATEOFARKANSAS 27 (Little Rock, 1868) [hereinafter DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS OF 1868 CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTION]. See also Cal Ledbetter, Jr., The
Constitution of 1868: Conqueror's Constitution or Constitutional Continuity, 44 ARK. HIST.
Q. 16 (1985).
28. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, Schedule, § I.
29. See Don't Vote for State Officers, ARK. GAZETrE, Feb. 18, 1868, at 2.
30. The military governor of Arkansas declared the proposed constitution adopted
by a vote of 27,913 to 26,597. See Letter from Major General Alvan C. Gillem,
Commander of Fourth Military District, to General U.S. Grant, Commander of Armies
of the United States (Apr. 23, 1868), reprinted in DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF 1868
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 804-09.
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C. The Republican Supreme Court of 1868-1874
The Constitution of 1868 increased the number of supreme court
justices from three to five." It also provided for the popular election of
the four associatejustice positions,32 and since the Republican nominees
were the only candidates on the ballot, they won election to these four
positions. Under the new constitution the governor appointed the chief
justice,3 and newly elected Republican Governor Powell Clayton named
a member of his party to head the new court. Consequently, on July 1,
1868, five Republican justices replaced three Conservative justices on
the state's highest court. The backgrounds of the five new justices
reflected the mix of newcomers and native Unionists who formed the
Arkansas Republican Party.34
The chief justice was William W. Wilshire, who was born in
Illinois in 1830. Following an unsuccessful stint in the California gold
fields in the early 1850s, he returned to Illinois in 1855 and became
involved in coal mining and the mercantile business. He began reading
law under the tutelage of a local attorney in 1859, but the outbreak of
the Civil War interrupted his legal education. In September of 1862 he
recruited a company of infantry that eventually became a part of the
126th Illinois Infantry Regiment. His regiment was a part ofthe Federal
army that captured Little Rock in the fall of 1863. He remained with
Union occupation forces in Little Rock until July of 1864 when he
resigned his commission due to his wife's ill health. After hostilities
ended, he returned to Little Rock and resumed the study of law. He was
admitted to practice in 1866, only two years before he assumed the
position of chief justice."
Justice Thomas M. Bowen was a native of Iowa who passed the bar
at age eighteen and briefly served in the Iowa legislature before moving
to Kansas in 1862. After helping recruit the 13th Kansas Infantry
regiment, he was commissioned a colonel and named commander of that
31. See ARK.CONST.of 1868, art. VII, § 3.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Despite overwhelming black support of the Republican Party, no African-
Americans were nominated for statewide positions in the 1868 election.
35. The biographical information on Wilshire is taken from BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989. SEN. Doc. No. 100-34, at 2064
(1989); 2 FAY HEMPSTEAD, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF ARKANSAS 718 (191 1); 13 THE
NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 483 (1906); I JOHN HALLUM,
BIOGRAPHICAL AND PICTORIAL HISTORY OF ARKANSAS 453 (1887); and Hon. W.W. Wilshire,
ARK. GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 1888, at 4.
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regiment. His unit joined the Union army that invaded northwest
Arkansas late in 1862 and participated in the battles at Cane Hill and
Prairie Grove. Bowen spent most of the remaining years of the war on
garrison duty in northwest Arkansas, although he did take an extended
leave to attend the 1864 Republican convention that re-nominated
President Abraham Lincoln. He also divorced his wife back in Kansas
and married the daughter of a prominent Van Buren physician. After
the war Bowen farmed in Crawford County, whose voters elected him
a delegate to the 1868 constitutional convention. Upon his arrival in
Little Rock the delegates selected him president of the convention. 6
A second constitutional convention delegate who moved to the
supreme court was John M. McClure. Like Bowen, McClure was a
recent arrival in the state. He was born in Ohio in 1834. After studying
law at his father's insistence, he was admitted to the bar in 1855 and for
the next six years practiced law in Kalida, Ohio. He entered the Union
Army in September of 1861 as a first lieutenant with the 57th Ohio
Infantry regiment and served with that unit throughout the war. During
most of the war, McClure's regiment was stationed east of the Missis-
sippi River, although it did participate in the successful siege of
Arkansas Post in 1863. McClure moved with his family to Arkansas in
July of 1865. He rented a confiscated plantation at Swan Lake in
Arkansas County and attempted unsuccessfully to raise cotton."' He
also worked for a time as an agent of the Freedman's Bureau, the entity
set up by Congress to assist newly freed slaves.38 After passage of the
Reconstruction Acts, McClure successfully sought election as a delegate
from Arkansas County to the 1868 constitutional convention. 9
The other two elected members of the court came from the native
Unionist wing of the Republican Party. Justice Lafayette Gregg was
born in Alabama in 1825, but his family moved to Washington County
36. Most of the biographical information regarding Bowen is taken from Gary
Craven Gray, Thomas Meade Bowen: The Early Years, 1835-1875 (1973) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Denver) (on file at University of Denver). Shorter
biographical sketches of Bowen appear in I DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 506
(1928) (reprint 1964); 12 NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 560 (1904).
37. See Orval T. Driggs, Jr., The Issues of the Powell Clayton Regime. 1868-1871, 8
ARK. HIST. Q. I, 5 (1949).
38. See Cortez A.M. Ewing, Arkansas Reconstruction Impeachments, 13 ARK. HIST.
Q. 137, 149 (1954).
39. Except as otherwise indicated, the biographical material on McClure is taken
from C.R. STEVENSON, ARKANSAS TERRITORY-STATE AND ITS HIGHESTCOURT 71 (1946);
19 THE NATIONALCYCLOPAEDIA OFAMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 224 (1926); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE NEW WEST 190-91 (1881 ); Judge McClure Called by Death, ARK. GAzETrE, July 8,
1915, at 10.
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in northwest Arkansas when he was ten. He represented Washington
County in the lower house of the Arkansas legislature for one term in
1854 and served as prosecuting attorney of the Fourth Judicial District
from 1856 until the start of the Civil War.' Throughout the secession
crisis and subsequent hostilities, Gregg remained loyal to the Union.4'
He assisted in recruiting and later commanded the Fourth Arkansas
Cavalry Volunteers." In December of 1866 he presided over a
convention of Unionists from counties in northwest Arkansas who
gathered at Fort Smith to pass resolutions supporting the reconstruction
policies of Congress and urging approval of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 A month later, Governor Murphy appointed Gregg to be
chancellor of the state's sole chancery court, but the Conservative-
dominated General Assembly of 1866-67 refused to confirm his
appointment."
Justice William M. Harrison was bom in Maryland in 1818. He
came to Arkansas in 1840 and taught school for a year in Chicot County
before returning to Maryland, where he continued to teach school while
studying law. Harrison returned to Arkansas in the spring of 1844 and
was licensed to practice law a year later. He opened an office at
Columbia in Chicot County but moved to Monticello after Drew County
was created in 1847." From 1852 to 1856, he represented Ashley,
Drew, and Chicot Counties in the Arkansas Senate.' He was elected to
the Arkansas House of Representatives in 1860, and in the tumultuous
session that immediately preceded the Civil War, he voted in favor of
calling a convention to consider secession. 7 Harrison's whereabouts
during the war are unclear. No records exist showing that he served in
either army. In any event, his wartime activities were apparently
sufficiently innocuous to render him acceptable to Unionist voters who
elected him judge of the second circuit court in 1 864.4" Four years later,
the Republican Party that met to nominate candidates for the 1868
election selected Harrison to run for the supreme court.
40. See HISTORICAL REPORTOF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 337, 464.
41. See ARK. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1891, at2.
42. See DAVID Y. THOMAS, ARKANSAS IN WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 385 (1926).
43. See Disunion Convention, ARK. GAZETTE, Jan. I, 1867, at 2 (weekly ed.).
44. See ARK. GAZETTE, January 22, 1867, at 2. The senate voted 21 to I not to
confirm Gregg. See id.
45. See Claimed by Death, ARK. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1900, at 2.
46. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 334-35.
47. See ARK. HOUSE JOURNAL 410 (1860).
48. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 458.
Harrison apparently did not take office until May 17, 1865. See id.
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Over the next five years, political infighting within the Republican
Party caused a shift in the initial balance between newcomers and native
Unionists on the court. In early February of 1871 Justice Thomas
Bowen announced his resignation, and Governor Clayton named John
E. Bennett to replace him. Two weeks later Chief Justice Wilshire
resigned, and Clayton elevated Associate Justice John McClure to the
position of chief justice and appointed Elhanan J. Searle to McClure's
associate justice seat.
Justice John M. Bennett was a native of New York and a graduate
of Genesee College at Lima, New York. At the outbreak of the Civil
War he enlisted in the 75th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment and
served with distinction east of the Mississippi. By the war's end he was
a brevet brigadier general and commander of an infantry brigade in the
Army of the Cumberland. In 1865 he joined the regular army as a
captain. While serving as judge advocate of the military district that
included Mississippi and Arkansas, he studied law and was admitted to
practice in Arkansas in 1868, the first year of reconstruction.49
Governor Clayton immediately appointed him judge of the firstjudicial
circuit (Mississippi, Crittenden, Desha, Monroe, and Phillips counties),"
and he still held that position when Clayton named him to Thomas
Bowen's seat on the supreme court.5"
Elhanan J. Searle, the otherjustice appointed during the February
1871 shakeup, was born in Illinois and graduated from Northwestern
University in 1859. After studying law he entered practice in Spring-
field, Illinois. In 1861 he enlisted as a private in the 10th Illinois
Volunteer Infantry Regiment and eventually rose to the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He probably came to Arkansas in 1862, and during
the winter of 1862-63 he was assigned to recruit volunteers from among
Unionists in north Arkansas. One ofthe regiments he helped recruit was
the First Arkansas Infantry Volunteers, and he served with the regiment
during the Union campaign in south Arkansas in the spring of 1864. He
later worked with future justice Lafayette Gregg to recruit the Fourth
Arkansas Cavalry Volunteer Regiment. After leaving the army in
August of 1865, Searle decided to remain in Arkansas.52 He opened a
49. 14 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 335 (1910) (reprint
1967).
50. See Act 7 of 17th Ark. General Assembly, 1868 Ark. Acts 25.
51. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 456.
52. The biographical information on Searle is taken from Carolyn Pollan, Fort
Smith Under Union Military Rule September 1, 1863 - Fall, 1865, 6 J. FT. SMITH HIST. SOC.
1. 6 n. 10 (1982); Clio Harper, Prominent Members ofthe Early Arkansas Bar-Biographies
of 1797-1884, at 328 (1940) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Arkansas History
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law practice in Fort Smith, and following the Republican ascent to
power in 1868 he served as prosecuting attorney and later judge of the
ninth judicial circuit (Mississippi, Crittenden, Desha, Monroe, and
Phillips counties)."
The last turnover on the Republican supreme court occurred in
1872. Incumbent justice William M. Harrison had broken with the
regular wing of the Republican Party and ran in 1872 on a Reform
Republican ticket nominated by dissident Republicans. The regular
Republicans nominated Circuit Judge Marshall L. Stephenson, who
defeated Harrison at the November 1872 general election.'
Stephenson's background was remarkably similar to McClure, Bennett,
and Searle. He was born in Kentucky, but he was raised in Granville,
Illinois, where his parents moved when he was still a child. He studied
law at Springfield and was admitted to the bar in 1860. When the Civil
War started, he joined the I 0th Illinois Cavalry Volunteer Regiment as
a captain and participated in campaigns in southern Missouri and
northern Arkansas. By 1863 he was a colonel and assigned to raise
troops in north Arkansas. He helped recruit the 2nd Arkansas Infantry
Volunteers and led six companies of that regiment in the 1864 south
Arkansas campaign. He settled in Fort Smith after the war and, after
briefly attending law school in Cincinnati, Ohio, was admitted to
practice in Arkansas in 1866." Before his election to the supreme court
he served as judge of the fourth (Van Buren, Searcy, Marion, Newton,
Carroll, and Madison counties)5 6 and firstjudicial circuits (Mississippi,
Crittenden, Desha, Monroe, and Phillips counties).57
The Republican supreme court ceased to exist in 1874 in the
aftermath of the political crisis known to history as the Brooks-Baxter
War. In May of 1874, Stephenson resigned, and the lower house of the
General Assembly impeached Bennett, McClure, and Searle." The
senate trial of the three justices was mooted by the adoption of the
Commission). See also THOMAS, supra note 42, at 385. In some sources, Searle's first
name is spelled "Elhanon."
53. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 475-76.
54. See id. at 452. Harrison unsuccessfully contested the election in federal court.
See Harrison v. Hadley, 11 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1873) (No. 6,137).
55. The biographical information on Stephenson is drawn from Harper, supra note
52, at 351; THOMAS, supra note 42, at 386; and Judge M. L. Stephenson Dies, ARK.
GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 1911. at 12.
56. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 463.
57. See id. at 456.
58. See General Assembly. ARK. GAZETTE, May 26, 1874, at ), ARK. GAZETTE, May
28, 1874, at I.
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state's current constitution in October of 1874, which ended the terms
of all justices serving under the Constitution of 1868."
The changes in the makeup of the supreme court during the period
covered by this article are summarized in the following table:
JUSTICES OF THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 6°
Position 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874
Const. of 1864 --- Const. of 1868 ---------------- ------------
Chief J. Walker -------- Wilshire ----------- McClure ---------------
Justice Compton ------ Gregg ---------------------------------
Justice Clendenin ------ Bowen ------------ Bennett ----------------
Justice Harrison ----------------------- Stephenson -
Justice McClure ----------- Searle ----------------
The contrast between the three justices who served on the supreme
court under the Constitution of 1864 during the period 1866-67 and the
eight who served on the court under the Constitution of 1868 during the
period 1868-74 was striking. The three formerjustices were elected on
a Conservative ticket. The eight newjustices were all Republicans. The
three Conservative justices had been prominent members of the
Confederate state government. All but one of the eight Republican
justices had served in the Union Army. All three Conservative justices
were longtime residents of the state. Six of the eight Republican
justices had moved to the state during or after the Civil War. These
differences in the backgrounds of the justices often led to divergent
positions on the legal questions produced by the war.
59. ARK. CONST. sched., § 21.
60. The assignment ofjustices to particular positions is based on the tables in the
HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. See supra note 12, at 452-54.
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II. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF SECESSION
Probably the most significant war-related issue considered by the
supreme court during the years after the war was the legal status of the
Confederate state government. Should the actions of that government,
particularly the orders and judgments of its courts, be recognized by
postwar courts?
The secession convention that withdrew Arkansas from the Union
in May of 1861 also adopted a new state constitution. When loyalist
delegates met in Little Rock in 1864 to draft a pro-Union constitution,
they made clear their views on the actions taken by their counterparts in
1861. The preamble to the Constitution of 1864 provided:
We, the people of the State of Arkansas, having the right to establish
for ourselves a Constitution in conformity with the Constitution ofthe
United States of America, recognizing the legitimate consequences of
the existing rebellion, do hereby declare the entire action of the late
convention of the State of Arkansas, which assembled in the City of
Little Rock on the 4th day of March, 1861, was, and is, null and void,
and is not now, and never has been, binding or obligatory upon the
people.
That all the action of the State of Arkansas under the authority
of said convention, of its ordinances, or of its Constitution, whether
legislative, executive, judicial or military (except as hereinafter
provided), was and is, declared null and void, provided that this
ordinance shall not be so construed as to affect the rights of individu-
als ... "I
This sweeping attempt to void retroactively all actions of the state
government taken during and subsequent to the secession convention
produced a number of supreme court cases during the postwar years.
A. Conservative Court
The Conservative supreme court addressed the scope of the 1864
constitutional preamble during its December 1866 term. The case was
a mundane debt collection action.62 in early 186 1, prior to secession and
the adoption of the Constitution of 1861, Hawkins sued Filkins in
Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking to collect a $450 promissory note.
Filkins offered no defense to the suit, and in September of 1861, after
61. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, preamble.
62. See Hawkins v. Filkins, 24 Ark. 286 (December Term 1866).
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secession and the adoption of the Constitution of 186 1, the circuit court
entered judgment in favor of Hawkins. Possibly because one or both
parties were absent from the county during the war, Hawkins made no
effort to enforce the judgment during the war. On July 24, 1865, two
months after hostilities ended in Arkansas, Hawkins attempted to levy
upon the property of Filkins, who defended on the grounds that the
judgment was void because the Pulaski County Circuit Court was not
a legal court when it entered the judgment in September of 1861. The
1865 circuit court stayed enforcement ofthejudgment until the supreme
court could rule on the question.
Filkins challenged the September 1861 judgment on several
grounds including:
I. The state government of Arkansas ceased to exist with the
adoption of the ordinance of secession and was not revived
until adoption of the Constitution of 1864.
2. The actions of Arkansas courts following secession were void
because the courts derived their power from the Confederate
States of America, a foreign government that failed to achieve
international recognition.
3. If the state government did continue to exist after secession
from the United States, all acts of that government were
invalidated by the preamble to Constitution of 1864.
ChiefJustice David Walker authored the court's opinion. Only five
years earlier in the same state capitol in which the court now sat, Walker
had presided over the convention that adopted the ordinance of
secession and the Constitution of 1861. Now he was called upon to
address the legal consequences of the convention's actions. If this
conflict caused the chiefjustice any discomfort, it is not reflected in his
opinion.
Walker first addressed the legal effect of Arkansas' attempt to
secede from the union. Whatever his personal views on the question,
Walker acknowledged that the recent war had settled one question-a
state had no power to dissolve the bonds that existed between it and the
national government. But he also argued that under the system of
federalism embodied in the United States Constitution, the existence of
the federal government depended on the existence of state governments.
Consequently, Walker reasoned that the war also settled that a state
could not destroy its own state government by attempting to withdraw
from the union. In short, Arkansas' attempt to secede from the Union
was a void act that did not impair the legitimacy of its state government.
[Vol. 23
POST-CIVIL WAR SUPREME COURT
Walker also rejected Filkins' contention that the wartime actions of
Arkansas courts were void because the courts derived their power from
the Confederate States of America, which was a foreign government that
failed to achieve international recognition by other nations as an
independent government. Walker concluded that Arkansas' affiliation
with the Confederacy in no way affected its rights or powers as a state.
For purposes of internal sovereignty, Arkansas continued to exist as a
state whether or not recognized by the United States or other nations,
and its state government was both the de facto and the de jure govern-
ment of the state until the adoption of a new state constitution in March
of 1864. All acts of the state government during such period, including
the acts of its courts, were valid and binding to the same extent as
though secession had never taken place.
Walker then took up Filkins' argument that the Constitution of
1864 retroactively invalidated the Constitution of 1861 and all acts of
the state government under that constitution. Walker had two responses
to Filkins' argument. The first was based on a principle already
announced by the court. Under the United States Constitution the
federal government depended on the existence of state governments, and
hence the Constitution required Arkansas to keep a state government in
existence. The second reason that the 1864 constitutional convention
could not retroactively nullify the 1861 Constitution and the actions of
the Confederate state government also relied on the United States
Constitution. According to Walker, such an attempt violated Article I,
section 10, of the United States Constitution, which prohibited a state
from passing either ex post facto laws or laws impairing the validity of
a contract.
Resorting to the rule of construction that courts must interpret a law
so as to preserve its constitutionality, Walker concluded that the
preamble to the 1864 Constitution voided the acts of the 1861 secession
convention and the Confederate state government only to the extent
such acts conflicted with the United States Constitution. The court
buttressed its reliance on the federal constitution by citing language in
the preamble to the 1864 Constitution which expressed the drafters'
desire "to establish for ourselves a constitution in conformity with the
constitution of the United States of America." Since establishing a
circuit court in Pulaski County to resolve legal disputes did not conflict
in any way with the United State Constitution, the 1861 judgment
rendered by the Confederate circuit court was valid and entitled to
enforcement by courts created under the Constitution of 1864.
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The court followed Hawkins v. Filkins in another case decided at the
December 1866 term. In Belier v. Page63 a creditor attempted to execute
on a judgment rendered by the Hempstead County Circuit Court in
November of 1862. The debtor moved to quash the execution on the
grounds that the circuit court did not legally exist in November of 1862.
Since Filkins clearly controlled the case, the supreme court upheld the
lower court's refusal to quash the execution."
The Conservative court distinguished Filkins in a third case decided
during its December 1866 term. Ex parte Osborn61 involved a man
convicted of second degree murder in Pulaski County Circuit Court.
According to a statute enacted on January 21, 1861, prior to secession,
the Pulaski County Circuit Court was scheduled to meet on the fourth
Monday after the fourth Monday of August." On November 18, 186 1,
the Confederate General Assembly changed the date on which the
circuit court met to the fourth Monday after the fourth Monday in
September.67 The constitutional convention that met in early 1864
declared that all laws in force in the state on March 4, 186 1, (the date
the secession convention first met) were still in force.6 The court that
convicted Osbom met on the date specified by the January 21, 1861,
legislation-i.e., the fourth Monday after the fourth Monday in August
of 1865. Prior to the war the supreme court had invalidated decisions
rendered by a circuit court that met at a time not provided by law.69 The
question presented by Osborn was which legislation controlled the
meeting date for Pulaski County Circuit Court-the act of January 21,
1861, or the act of November 18, 1861. The court concluded that the
1864 constitutional convention could repeal all legislation enacted after
March 4, 1861, and revive wholesale all legislation existing on that date.
It distinguished its holding in Hawkins v. Filkins. There the circuit court
met in September of 1861, prior to the November 1861 legislation
63. 24 Ark. 363 (December Term 1866).
64. The status of the Confederate courts was not addressed in Millar v. Henderson,
24 Ark. 344 (December Term 1866), because neither party appears to have questioned
the authority of the Ouachita Probate Court to issue letters of administration in
February of 1864.
65. 24 Ark. 479 (December Term 1866).
66. See Act 198 of 13th Ark. General Assembly; 1860 Ark. Acts 374, 377, § 5.
67. See Act 60 of 13th Ark. General Assembly, I st Spec. Sess.; 1861 Ark. Acts 74.
68. The court's opinion in Exparle Osborne, 24 Ark. 479, 481 (December Term
1866), quotes from an ordinance adopted by the 1864 Constitutional Convention.
However, no such ordinance appears in the official records of the convention. See
1864-65 Ark. Acts at 29-30.
69. See Brumley v. State, 20 Ark. 77 (January Term 1859).
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moving the meeting date. Hence, the Filkinsjudgment was rendered by
a court that met at the time established by the pre-secession legislation."'
B. Republican Court
It took the Republican supreme court that assumed the bench in
July of 1868 several years to sort out its view of the Confederate state
government. One of the first appeals considered by the new court was
Kelley v. State.7' Kelley was a white man who was charged in October
of 1866 in Pulaski County Circuit Court with the robbery of Armstead,
who was black. At Kelley's trial, his attorney objected to testimony by
Armstead, citing a prewar statute that barred persons of the African race
from testifying against a white person.72 Six months earlier Congress
had passed a Civil Rights Act granting all persons of every race and
color full rights of citizenship, including the right to give evidence in
legal proceedings.' The trial judge permitted the testimony, and Kelley
was convicted. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Kelley's
appeal did not reach the supreme court until the June 1869 term, by
which time the governor had pardoned Kelley. The appeal presented a
narrow question. Kelley's attorney argued that the state of Arkansas
retained the exclusive right to regulate proceedings in her courts and to
determine the competency of witnesses, and that Congress lacked the
power under the United States Constitution to provide otherwise.
In an opinion joined by Justices Bowen and Wilshire, Justice Gregg
upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Gregg cited
Article IV, section 4, of the United States Constitution, which requires
the United States to guarantee to every state a republican form of
government, as the source of Congressional power to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. According to Gregg, when Arkansas seceded, the
republican government guaranteed by the United States Constitution
ceased to exist, and the Constitution obligated the federal government
70. Osborn was tried after the adoption of the Constitution of 1864 in March of
1864. The Osborn court did not discuss the effect of ajudgment rendered by a court
that met before March of 1864 according to the November 1861 schedule, but it would
have presumably upheld such ajudgment. It would have made little sense for the court
to uphold the legitimacy of courts of the Confederate state government, as it did in
Hawkins v. Filkins, but then conclude that all actions taken by such courts were invalid
because the courts met on the wrong date.
71. 25 Ark. 392 (June Term 1969).
72. See Gould's Digest, Ch. 181, § 25 (1858).
73. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of
1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144) (now codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994)).
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to take such action as was necessary to restore a government republican
in form, including passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Kelley court did not specifically invalidate all actions by the
Confederate state government, but that was the implication of its
conclusion that a republican state government did not exist in Arkansas
following its secession. The court's broad language even cast a cloud
over actions taken by what the court referred to as the "provisional"
state government that operated under the Constitution of 1864 between
1864 and 1868. Since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act at issue in
Kelley during the tenure of the "provisional" government, Kelley implied
that the federal government was still in the process of restoring a
republican form of government to the state in 1866 and that the
restoration process was not complete until the state adopted the
Constitution of 1868.' 4 This would have meant that Arkansas lacked a
state government from secession in May of 1861 until adoption of the
Constitution of 1868 in March of 1868. Justice McClure, probably the
most radical member of the Republican court, dissented in Kelley v.
State. He thought that Kelley's subsequent pardon made the case a poor
vehicle for establishing "great and new principles of law." 5
At its December 1870 term, the Republican court was presented
with an opportunity to invalidate the actions of the state government that
existed from March of 1864 to March of 1868. The General Assembly
that met from November 5, 1866, to March 23, 1867, passed an act
which granted a full pardon and amnesty to persons who had committed
any crime except rape between May 6, 1861, and July 4, 1865.76 In
March of 1869 a Pulaski County grand jury indicted a man named
Nichols for a murder committed on July 10, 1864. Nichols claimed
immunity from prosecution under the 1867 amnesty act, and the circuit
court dismissed the charges. The state appealed to the supreme court,
arguing that the General Assembly's attempt to pardon persons who had
committed crimes encroached on a power reserved exclusively to the
governor under the Constitution of 1864.'7 The supreme court pointed
out that the Constitution of 1864 conferred on the governor the power
74. The language used by the court to describe the government formed under the
1864 Constitution mirrors that used by the 1868 constitutional convention. When
Conservatives proposed adopting the 1864 Constitution in lieu of a new constitution,
Republicans countered that the government formed under the 1864 Constitution was
"provisional" and "unrepublican." DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF 1868 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 88-123.
75. See Kelley, 25 Ark. at 404.
76. See Act 71 of the 16th Ark. General Assembly; 1867 Ark. Acts 169 (1867).
77. See State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74 (December Term 1870).
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to grant pardons "after conviction" and held that the legislature could
grant pardons "before conviction" without exceeding its constitutional
powers.
The importance of the Nichols opinion was that it necessarily
confirmed the legitimacy of the government formed under the Constitu-
tion of 1864. The court did not even discuss the validity in general of
actions of the state government formed under the Constitution of 1864.
Notably absent from the opinion were the references to the "provi-
sional" character of the 1864-1868 government that had appeared in
Kelley, and the opinion seemed to resolve any doubts about the character
of the 1864-68 government by stating that in a "republican form of
government," as contrasted with a monarchial form of government, the
power to pardon can be shared by all three branches of government.
The next "secession" case to reach the Republican court involved
actions of a Confederate state court after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of 1864. In Page v. Cook,7" the probate clerk of Columbia county,
who was acting as clerk under the Constitution of 1861 and a commis-
sion issued by Confederate Governor Harris Flanagin, issued letters of
administration to the administratrix of an estate on March 31, 1864. The
probate court ruled that any claims not presented to the administratrix
within two years of her appointment were barred. Even the Conserva-
tive supreme court of 1866-1868 had been willing to concede that the
only legitimate government existing in the state after March 14, 1864,
was the Unionist government organized under the Constitution of 1864.
The Republican court reached the same conclusion and ruled that a clerk
elected under the Constitution of 1861 had no authority to issue letters
of administration after the adoption of the Constitution of 1864. Hence,
the statute of limitations on claims against the state did not start to run
until the administratrix obtained new letters from a court formed under
the new constitution. Justice Harrison, probably the most conservative
member of the Republican court, dissented, but his opinion does not
appear in the official reports.
Although Kelley presaged the demise of Hawkins v. Filkins, it was
not until Penn v. Tollison,79 decided during the June 1871 term, that the
Republican court expressly overruled the Conservative court's decision
validating acts of the Confederate state government. The facts of the
case suggest that the court may have gone out of its way to address the
legitimacy of the Confederate state government that existed from May
78. 26 Ark. 122 (December Term 1870).
79. 26 Ark. 545 (June Term 1871).
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of 1861 until March of 1864. The case involved lands whose title had
been the subject of litigation since 1856. The precise question
presented to the supreme court was whether a minor named Penn had
been properly made a party to the lawsuit pursuant to a Crittenden
County Circuit Court publication order entered in September of 1861.
Although it is not clear that Penn's counsel questioned the legitimacy of
the government created by the Constitution of 1861," the court
proceeded immediately to that issue.
The opinion, authored by Chief Justice McClure, rejected the
suggestion that the court was bound by the Conservative court's
decision in Filkins. Filkins had interpreted the preamble to the Constitu-
tions of 1864, which declared all acts of the secession convention null
and void but provided that this ordinance "shall not be so construed as
to affect the rights of individuals." After Filkins, the people of Arkansas
had adopted the Constitution of 1868, which likewise declared void the
acts of the secession convention, but with a proviso that the declaration
"shall not be so construed as to affect the rights of private individuals,
arising under contracts between the parties."82 As a delegate to the 1868
constitutional convention, McClure had served on the committee that
drafted the constitution,83 and according to McClure, this change in the
preamble language was designed to overrule Filkins. The only rights
preserved by the Constitution of 1868 were those of "private individu-
als," and all public acts of the state under the Constitution of 1861 were
declared null and void.
The court next addressed whether the state government under the
Constitution of 1836 continued to exist following the state's secession.
In Filkins the Conservative court had concluded that "it was not intended
by the [1861] Convention to destroy the State government,"'" but the
Republican court in Penn v. Tollison disagreed. In an ironic twist, the
80. In 1856 Tollison filed suit to enforce a vendor's lien against certain lands and
purchased the lands at the foreclosure sale. The vendee challenged the sale. In Penn s
Administrator v. Tolleson [sic], 20 Ark. 652 (October Term 1859), the Arkansas Supreme
Court set aside the sale and ordered the property resold. On remand the circuit court
permitted Tollison to serve Penn by publication. See Penn, 26 Ark. at 550.
81. The summary of arguments that precedes the report of the case states that the
order of publication was entered "pending the rebellion" at the September 1861 term
of court and then asks rhetorically: "Will the court hold this to be good, or null and
void to all intents and purposes?" See Penn, 26 Ark. at 547.
82. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 25 (emphasis added).
83. McClure was one of seven delegates who served on the Committee on the
Constitution, its Arrangement and Phraseology. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OFTHE 1868
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 13.
84. See Filkins, 24 Ark. at 302.
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court cited as support for its position a decision rendered by the
Confederate state supreme court after the adoption of the Constitution
of 1864. In State v. Williams85 the Confederate state supreme court sitting
in Washington removed Sam Williams, the Confederate state attorney
general, from office after he took the oath of allegiance to the United
States. When Arkansas seceded, the secession convention required all
state officers to appear before it and take an oath of allegiance to the
Confederate States. 6 If Sam Williams ceased to be the attorney general
of the Confederate state government when he took the oath of allegiance
to the United States, then it followed that the entire state government of
Arkansas ceased to exist in May of 1861 when its officers took the oath
of allegiance to the Confederate States. As the Republican court viewed
it:
When the army of the United States subdued the rebellion, in the
State of Arkansas, in all the State of Arkansas there was no person
who ever claimed to belong to the State government of 1836, or who
claimed to be an officer of the same. When the federal arms had
restored the peace, within the borders of the state, they found the
Constitution of 1836 and that of 1861. That of 1861 was hostile to
the federal government, and because it was formed in aid of rebellion,
could not be recognized. They then involuntarily turned to the
Constitution of 1836, and found it like the engine whose motive
power is gone, a perfect, but dormant instrument .... Here was the
Constitution of 1836, and the people who framed and adopted it, but
there was no officer or person clothed with the legal power of filling
vacancies in several departments, or who was authorized, either by
the Constitution or laws of the State, to call an election, and yet we
are told that the State government was not destroyed, in the State of
Arkansas, by reason of the rebellious acts we have mentioned."'
The court then turned to the actions taken at the 1861 secession
convention. If the state government organized under the Constitution
of 1836 ceased to exist in May of 1861, did a new state government
come into existence at that time? The court responded in the negative,
85. State v. Williams does not appear in the official reports. The opinion appears at
pages 234 to 420 of Records of the Opinions ofthe Arkansas Supreme Court Delivered
at Washington, the Temporary Seat of Government on Aug. 8, 1864. After the war it
was published in installments in the MEMPHIS APPEAL on Feb. 26, 1867, at I; Feb. 26,
1867, at 1; Feb. 28, 1867, at i; Mar. I, 1867, at 1; March 2, 1867, at 1; March 5, 1867,
at 1; March 6, 1867, at 1; March 7, 1867, at 1 March 8, 1867, at I; March 14, 1867,
at 1, March 15, 1867, at 1, March 16, 1867, at 1; and March 19, 1867, at 1.
86. See JOURNAL OF BOTH SESSIONS, supra note 3, at 290-93.
87. See Penn, 26 Ark. at 560-61.
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citing several problems with the entire process by which the convention
purported to create a new state government. The most serious defect
was that people of Arkansas had never delegated to the convention the
power to adopt a new constitution for the state. According to the act,
authorizing a vote on calling a convention, the convention was to "take
into consideration the condition of political affairs, and determine what
course the State of Arkansas shall take in the present political crisis.""8
This limited charter did not authorize the convention to adopt a
constitution that created a new state government to replace that existing
under the Constitution of 1836."9 In a bit of overkill, the Tollison court
also deemed defective the procedure whereby the convention had
adjourned on March 21, 1861, and was recalled by its president on May
6, 186 1, "[fjor if this doctrine be conceded, the Convention would have
the power to perpetuate itself for all time to come, if the President
thereof should be of the opinion that such an emergency had arisen."9
According to the Republican court, the convention's work was complete
on March 21, 1861, and all acts of the convention subsequent to that
date, including the adoption of the Constitution of 1861, were of no
legal effect.
This left only the question whether the acts of the government
created by the Constitution of 1861 were entitled to recognition as those
of a de facto government. The court's resolution of this question was
probably the weakest part of its opinion in Tollison. It conceded that the
convention might have been able to form a de facto government under
the United States Constitution, but it could not form a de facto govern-
ment outside the United States Constitution. When it joined the Union
in 1836, Arkansas did not reserve the right to assume the "inherent and
rightful powers of an independent government."' Moreover, no state
can exist except as a member of the United States. The organization
that controlled Arkansas after secession was not a government at all but
only evidence of what the state government would have been had the
rebellion succeeded.
If the supreme court were to declare today that all actions taken by
the state of Arkansas and its political subdivisions over a three year
period were null and void, the result would be chaos. Fortunately, the
88. See Act 105 of the 13th General Assembly, § 8, 1860 Ark. Acts 216.
89. In 1862 the same question was presented to the Confederate state supreme
court which deemed the question too political to be considered by the court. See Ex
pare Danley & Johnson, 24 Ark. 2 (June Term 1862).
90. See Penn, 26 Ark. at 573.
91. Seeid.at 574.
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impact of the Republican court's declaration that the government of
Arkansas ceased to exist on May 6, 1861, was mitigated by the limited
role played in the lives of citizens by state government in the I 860s.
Moreover, both the Constitution of 1864 and the Constitution of 1868
carefully preserved from invalidation certain routine actions of the
Confederate state government, including the administration of oaths by
public officials, the acknowledgment of deeds and other documents, and
the solemnization of marriage.92 The primary effect of the decision in
Tollison was to force the relitigation of numerous cases decided by
Confederate state courts.
During the same June 1871 term that it handed down Penn v.
Tollison the court decided a similar case, Thompson v. Mankin,93 with
similar results. Mankin sued Thompson in the Arkansas County Circuit
Court, and in August of 1861 the court clerk issued a summons ordering
Thompson to appear and answer the complaint at the November session
of the circuit court. There was apparently no further action in the case
until October of 1865, when Mankin obtained a default judgment
against Thompson. The question before the supreme court was whether
the summons issued in August 1861 gave the circuit court personal
jurisdiction over Thompson. The supreme court held it did not and sent
the case back to permit Thompson to plead to the complaint. Rather
than simply apply Tollison, which clearly controlled, Justice Gregg
authored a long rambling opinion much of which appears to be
unnecessary to a decision on the narrow issue before the court. It is
possible that rather than issue a concurring opinion in Tollison, Gregg
used Thompson v. Mankin to air his views on the effect of secession. He
based his conclusion that all executive, legislative,judicial, and military
acts under the Constitution of 1861 were void primarily on the specific
language of the Constitution of 1868. Possibly anticipating the
argument that by nullifying all acts of the Confederate government the
court was abridging property rights, Gregg made the point that a
conquering power had no obligation to respect property rights in a
conquered territory. He also argued that because nothing bound the
United States government to recognize the acts taken by a state
government during the period the state was not in the Union, the courts
of the state, upon its readmission to the union, had no authority to hold
such acts valid.
92. See ARK. CONST. of 1864, preamble; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 25.
93. 26 Ark. 586 (June Term 1871).
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Timms v. Grace,' also decided at the June 1871 term, was more
typical of the cases that followed Penn v. Tollison. In July of 1868
Timms asked the supreme court to quash a judgment entered against
him by the Desha County Circuit Court in October of 1861. The case
had been pending in the supreme court for almost three years before the
court declared the judgment void under Tollison. Similar results were
reached in Carroll v. Boyd,9 which involved the validity of a judgment
rendered by a justice of the peace in September of 1 861; Cooksey v.
McCrery,9 which involved payment received in November of 1863 by
an administrator appointed earlier the same year; and Cowser v. State ex
rel Burt,97 which involved a probate order entered in August of 1861.
Penn v. Tollison was undoubtedly costly to those parties who were
forced to relitigate issues decided by the Confederate state courts, but it
may have actually saved the state and local governments a great deal of
money. Many public officials had not been paid or paid only irregularly
during the war years. By declaring valid the Confederate state govern-
ment that existed following secession, Hawkins v. Filkins opened the door
for these officials to file sizeable backpay claims. After the decision in
Filkins, W.R. Cain, who served as judge of the third judicial circuit
during the war," filed a claim with the state auditor seeking $7,018 due
him as salary from July 1861 to September 1865. When the state
auditor refused to pay the claim, the administrator of Cain's estate
applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment. In Black v.
Auditor," which was decided six months before Tollison, the Republican
supreme court ruled that mandamus would lie to compel the payment of
the salary although it dismissed Cain's petition for lack of proper
verification. By invalidating the state government formed under the
Constitution of 1861, Tollison foreclosed a flood of similar, properly
verified, petitions from state and local Confederate officials claiming
pay for wartime service.
A case decided at the December 1871 term, Vinsant v. Knox,"'°
resolved the effect of Hawkins v. Filkins before it was overruled by Penn
v. Tollison. Vinsant had been appointed administratrix of her husband's
estate in April of 1862. The husband owed Knox $500, but Knox did
94. 26 Ark. 598 (June Term 1871).
95. 27 Ark. 183 (December Tern 1871).
96. 27 Ark. 303 (December Term 1871).
97. 27 Ark. 444 (June Term 1872).
98. Cain served from 1860 until the end of the war. See HISTORICAL REPORTOFT14E
SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 46 1.
99. 26 Ark. 237 (December Term 1870).
100. 27 Ark. 266 (December Term 1871).
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not file a claim against the estate until March of 1871. The question
was whether the two year period for filing claims against the estate had
run when the claim was filed. Clearly, the statute did not begin to run
when Vinsant was named administratrix in 1862, because the order of
the Confederate probate court was void under Tollison. Vinsant argued,
however, that the statute did continue to run during the period between
December 1866, when Filkins was decided, and June 1871, when Filkins
was overruled by Tollison. The supreme court disagreed, ruling that
Filkins should be treated as never having been the law and that no person
acquired any rights under the decision.
Ill. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS PAYABLE IN CONFEDERATE
MONEY
During the Civil War, there were two media of exchange in
Arkansas-the United States dollar and the Confederate States dollar.
The value of Confederate currency relative to United States currency
fluctuated throughout the war depending on the battlefield success of
Confederate armies. Because the United States government would
continue to exist regardless of the war's outcome, Confederate dollars
were never as valuable as United States dollars.
After the war ended, suits seeking to enforce contracts and
promissory notes executed during the war years flooded the trial courts
of Arkansas. Contracts or notes specifically calling for payment in
"U.S. dollars" posed no interpretive problem for the courts, but such
obligations were probably the exception. More common were wartime
contracts or notes that called for payment in "Confederate dollars" or
those that called for payment in "dollars" without specifying whether
the parties meant United States dollars or Confederate dollars. Postwar
lawsuits involving such contracts or notes raised two legal questions.
First, if the contract or note was payable in "dollars," could the debtor
introduce parol evidence to show that the parties intended for payment
to be made in Confederate dollars? Second, if the contract or note was
payable in Confederate dollars, how should a court measure the debtor's
obligation? Requiring the creditor to accept payment in Confederate
dollars was no remedy at all since after the war Confederate dollars were
worthless. Requiring the debtor to pay the face amount of a debt in
United States dollars was equally objectionable since United States
dollars were invariably worth many times the consideration originally
received by the debtor.
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A. Conservative Court
The Conservative supreme court, which considered the issue during
the December 1866 term, staked out a formalistic position on the
Confederate money question. Roane v. Green'"' was an action brought
by Green and Wilson to collect a promissory note dated October 24,
1862, in which Roane promised to pay the two plaintiffs "nine hundred
dollars" for cattle. Roane sought to show that she had paid a portion of
the purchase price in Confederate money and delivered her promissory
note in the same medium for the balance of the purchase price. At the
time Roane delivered her note, a Confederate dollar was worth only
about ten cents compared to a United States dollar. The supreme court
declined to interpret the note as requiring payment in Confederate
dollars because to do so would violate the parol evidence rule. This
rule, which most students learn in their first semester of law school,
states that:
when the contract is reduced to writing in plain, definite and unam-
biguous terms, and accepted by the parties contracting as the sole
evidence of the contract between them, they become bound by it, and
will not thereafter be permitted to introduce parol evidence to alter,
or vary it in terms or meaning. 2
Although a party can introduce parol evidence to explain an ambiguity
in a writing, the court found no ambiguity in the word "dollars," which,
it said, could never be interpreted to mean Confederate paper currency.
In Hastings v. White,' 3 also decided duringthe December 1866 term,
the court took the same inflexible position. The creditor brought suit in
the Randolph County Circuit Court on a promissory note for $150. The
debtor argued that the note was to be paid in Confederate dollars worth,
at the time the note was executed, only twelve cents in United States
dollars. The circuit court agreed with the debtor and awarded the
creditor judgment on the note in the amount of $18.75 plus costs. On
appeal the supreme court reversed. Citing its earlier decision in Roane,
the court refused to look outside the four comers of the promissory note
to determine whether the parties intended some medium of payment
other than United States dollars.
These two decisions by the Conservative court imposed a hardship
on the debtors while producing a windfall to the creditors. Because the
101. 24 Ark. 210 (December Term 1866).
102. See Roane, 24 Ark. at 212.
103. 24 Ark. 269 (December Term 1866).
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notes in both cases were executed in areas under Confederate control,
it seems likely that the parties intended the word "dollars" to mean
Confederate dollars and set the amount of payment based on the value
of a Confederate dollar at the time of the contract.
The General Assembly, which was meeting in early 1867 when the
Conservative court decided Roane and Hastings, immediately overturned
the decisions. On March 5, 1867, shortly after the supreme court
handed down the latter decision," the legislature passed the Confeder-
ate Money Act.0 5 The act permitted a debtor to introduce evidence of
the parties' intent when a wartime agreement failed to identify the type
of currency in which payment was to be made. The act also provided
that recovery under an agreement payable in Confederate money was to
be based on the value of Confederate money in United States dollars at
the time and place of making the agreement.
At its June 1867 term the Conservative court decided two more
cases in which the debtor argued that a note denominated in "dollars"
was actually payable in Confederate dollars."° The court invoked Roane
in both cases without mentioning the Confederate Money Act. The
probable explanation for this omission was that both cases were tried
before March 5, 1867, the effective date of the act.
The Conservative court never considered a promise to pay
"Confederate dollars," so it is impossible to state with certainty how the
court would have treated a promise to pay an obligation denominated in
a valueless currency. It seems likely, however, that the court would
have applied the rule embodied in the Confederate Money Act, whether
or not the act technically applied, and ordered the debtor to pay an
amount in United States dollars equal in value to Confederate money at
the time and place of the agreement.
B. Republican Court
The Republican supreme court that took office in July of 1868
considered three Confederate money cases at its December 1868 term.
The first was Moody v. Hawkins"°7 in which a creditor sought to collect
104. The court handed down its decision in Hastings v. White on January 16, 1867.
See Ark. Sup. Ct. Judgment Book A-No. 2 at 62. Roane v. Green was decided on
December 22, 1866. See id. at 41.
105. See Act 88 ofthe 16th Ark. General Assembly, 1867 Ark. Acts 195.
106. See Busby v. Atkins, 24 Ark. 540 (June Term 1867); Yell v. Snow, 24 Ark. 554
(June Term 1867).
107. 25 Ark. 191 (December Term 1868).
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on three written promises to pay, each bearing interest at ten percent.
The debtor argued that at the time he made the promises the universal
medium of exchange was Confederate currency, then worth only about
twenty percent of United States dollars. Citing Roane v. Green, the
Republican court curtly rejected this argument as an attempt to set up a
parol contract different from the terms agreed by the parties. The debtor
also argued that the promises were usurious, apparently on the theory
that they obligated him to repay an amount equal to five times the value
of the consideration he received. The court conceded that a contract that
on its face charged a legal rate of interest could illegally cover an intent
to charge a usurious rate of interest, but it ruled that the mere depreci-
ated value of Confederate money at the time the debt arose was
insufficient to prove such an intention.
Later in the same term, in Jordan v. Mitchell, °8 the court again
declined to infer a corrupt intent to charge a usurious rate of interest
from the depreciated value of Confederate currency. In Johnson v.
Walker,"° decided a few days later, the court refused to consider the
Confederate money question because neither party had raised the issue.
Curiously, the Republican court did not address the applicability of
the Confederate Money Act in any of the three cases decided early in its
December 1868 term even though both parties in Moody v. Hawkins
raised the issue. "' It may be that the Confederate Money Act was not
technically applicable to a case tried before the effective date of the act.
The court did consider the Confederate Money Act in a fourth case
decided during the December 1868 term. In Leach v. Smith"' a creditor
brought suit on two promissory notes, each in the amount of $2,085 and
each payable in "dollars." The debtor contended that the notes were to
be paid in Confederate money, which at the time of the transaction had
a value of only $836.66. Pursuant to the Confederate Money Act the
debtor was prepared to pay the lesser amount in United States notes.
The Republican court proceeded to rule the act unconstitutional on the
ground that it impaired the validity of contracts contrary to both the
United States and Arkansas constitutions. The parties had agreed to
payment in Confederate money, a currency with fluctuating value. By
requiring payment in a different medium of exchange--either gold,
silver, or United States notes-the Confederate Money Act materially
altered the terms agreed to by the parties. The court also struck down
108. 25 Ark. 258 (December Term 1868).
109. 25 Ark. 197 (December Term 1868).
110. See Moody, 25 Ark. at 192-93 (summary of arguments).
I II. 25 Ark. 246 (December Term 1868).
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that portion of the act permitting the parties to offer evidence of the
parties' intent regarding the currency in which payment was to be made.
Without ruling whether such a provision, standing alone, would be
constitutional, the court concluded that the two provisions of the act
were inseparable and that the unconstitutionality of one provision
invalidated the other.)1
2
The court's opinion in Leach may have been a knee jerk reaction to
an act passed by a pro-Confederate General Assembly that validated
debts contracted in Confederate money. It must have soon dawned on
the Republican justices that their decision was a bonanza for those
creditors who had provided goods or money during the war in exchange
for a promise to pay in Confederate money. Following the Leach
decision, these creditors could collect far more than the actual value of
the goods or money they provided to debtors. In effect, the decision
rewarded those persons whose loyalty to the Confederacy made them
willing to accept a promise to pay in a currency of dubious value.
The Republican court remedied this oversight in dramatic fashion
a year later at the December 1869 term when it decided Latham v.
Clark."3 The case was a suit to collect a promissory note dated March
1, 1863, which by its terms was payable in "Confederate money." The
sole question presented to the court was the enforceability of a contract
which expressly called for the payment of Confederate money. The
opinion began by noting that the Confederate government issued money
to finance an unlawful rebellion against the United States. From this
incontestable premise the court proceeded to the questionable conclu-
sion that any private citizen who accepted and used Confederate money
became a participant in a conspiracy to commit treason against the
United States. The court said:
What would have been the result if the people of the rebellious State
had not received and used "Confederate money" in their private
transactions, and it had failed to become a circulating medium among
them?
112. After enactment of the Confederate Money Act, the debtors in Roane v. Green
and Hastings v. White, the two cases decided by the Conservative court, sought to take
advantage of the act. After it invalidated the Confederate Money Act in Leach v. Smith,
the Republican court ruled against both debtors. See Green v. Roane, 26 Ark. 15
(December Term 1870) and Hastings v. White, 26 Ark. 308 (December Term 1870). The
court also followed Leach v. Smith in Woodruff v. Tilly, 25 Ark. 309 (June Term 1869),
where it refused to permit the introduction of parol evidence to show that the parties
intended payment in Confederate dollars.
113. 25 Ark. 574 (December Term 1869).
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The answer is obvious, that the Confederate Government must
have failed at once; its armies, in open hostility to the national
Government, disbanded; its soldiers returned to peaceful pursuits; the
lives of hundreds of thousands of the best men of the land, both North
and South, would have been saved; the nation would have escaped the
expenditure of untold millions of treasure, and the long train of evils,
hardships, misery and woe, consequences ofthe rebellion, would have
been avoided.
If this be true, of which we have no doubt, then we think that the
use by the people, in their private transactions, of "Confederate
money," and the support, currency and circulation given it by such
use, so connected all contracts between such individuals, based upon
or for the payment of it, with the illegality of its issue, and the
purpose for which it was used, as to taint such contracts with the
illegality of the original issue of the pretended money, and render
them void, as being opposed to public policy.... ."
The court's reasoning ignored the reality of day-to-day economic
life in Confederate Arkansas. Whatever their feelings about secession
and the Confederacy, most persons in Confederate controlled Arkansas
probably had little choice but to use Confederate money. In fact, in 1862
General Thomas J. Hindman, the commander of Confederate troops in
Arkansas, and for a time the military dictator of the state, threatened to
imprison any person who refused to accept Confederate money at par."'
An additional problem with the court's decision was that it invalidated
only contracts specifically calling for payment in Confederate money.
Wartime contracts calling for payment in "dollars" were apparently not
null and void because the parol evidence rule barred evidence that the
parties meant "Confederate dollars."
Only Justice Harrison, the longtime resident who may have lived
in Confederate controlled Arkansas during most of the war, resisted the
court's rush to punish any person who had accepted a promise to pay
Confederate money. In a calm, well reasoned dissent, he agreed that the
issuance of Confederate money was an illegal act, but he argued that the
illegality of Confederate money did not taint a contract in which the
consideration was Confederate money because the illegality was
collateral to rather than an inherent part of the contract. Harrison also
pointed out that Confederate money was the only circulating medium of
exchange in the state and that persons subject to the de facto control of
114. See Latham, 25 Ark. at 585.
115. See Gen. Orders No. 4, Hdqrs. Trans-Mississippi Dist. (June 2, 1862), reprinted
in Official Reports, series I. vol. 15, at 782 (GPO 1886).
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the Confederate government were obliged to use Confederate money in
their business transactions.
The majority in Latham v. Clark took a position directly antithecal
to that adopted only months earlier by the United States Supreme Court
in a Confederate money case out of Alabama. In Thorington v. Smith"6
the United States Supreme Court characterized the Confederate States
as a government by paramount force analogous to a foreign power that
occupied United States territory. Private citizens subject to such a
government were obligated to obey it in civil matters and were not
responsible as wrongdoers for such obedience. It necessarily followed
that:
Contracts stipulating for payments in [the currency of a government
by paramount force] cannot be regarded for that reason only, as made
in aid of the foreign invasion in the one case, or of the domestic
insurrection in the other. They have no necessary relations to the
hostile government, whether invading or insurgent. They are
transactions in the ordinary course of civil society, and, though they
may indirectly and remotely promote the ends of the unlawful
government, are without blame, except when proved to have been
entered into with actual intent to further the invasion or
insurrection." 7
The majority opinion in Latham made no effort to distinguish its holding
from that of the United States Supreme Court in Thorington, stating
imperiously that, "[W]e regret that our convictions of duty impel us to
a different conclusion."' 18
The decision in Latham v. Clark left open the status of executed
contracts in which a creditor had accepted payment of a debt in
Confederate money. Was the creditor now entitled to payment in legal
currency? The court quickly foreclosed this possibility in Glenn v.
Case,"9 which was a suit by a creditor against the estate of a deceased
debtor on a $250 promissory note executed in October of 1860. The
creditor alleged that in 1863 the debtor had threatened to report him to
the provost marshal if he did not accept Confederate notes in payment
of the note. Arguing that the forced payment did not extinguish the
debt, the creditor filed a claim against the debtor's estate after the war.
116. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1868).
117. See Thorington, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 11-12.
118. See Latham, 25 Ark. at 593. The court reiterated its Latham v. Clark holding in
Fordv. Ragland, 25 Ark. 612 (December Term 1869).
119. 25 Ark. 616 (December Term 1869). A related case, Case v. Glenn, 25 Ark. 620
(December Term 1869), was also appealed to the court.
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The supreme court declined to set aside the payment, stating that when
the parties were inpari delicto--i.e., equally wrong-the courts should
leave them in the condition in which they have put themselves. The
court's reasoning is dubious, since the doctrine of equal wrong hardly
seems applicable to a case in which one party alleged that he was forced
to engage in an illegal act, but the result was sound. Had the court
permitted the creditor in Glenn to collect the debt a second time, it
would have opened the door for all creditors who had accepted payment
in Confederate dollars during the war to argue that they did so under
duress and now preferred to be paid in United States dollars.
Latham v. Clark and Glen v. Case, both decided during the December
1869 term, clearly established that the Republican court would not
enforce executory contracts calling for payment in Confederate money
but would not disturb executed contracts in which payment had been
made in Confederate money. These two decisions slowed the flood of
the Confederate money cases, but the issue continued to surface in
variations not specifically covered by the two cases.
Three Confederate money cases reached the high court during its
December 1870 term. Jordan v. Walker'20 involved an attempt to collect
a promissory note delivered in exchange forConfederate treasury notes.
In an effort to avoid the holding of Latham v. Clark, the creditor argued
that although the consideration for the note was Confederate treasury
notes, the note itself was payable in United States currency. The
supreme court deemed the distinction irrelevant and ruled that the
contract was void ab initio because the consideration for the note was
illegal.
In George v. Terry,'2' also decided at the December 1870 term, a
cotton planter had promised during the war to deliver one hundred bales
of cotton for $2,600, for which the purchaser paid $2,600 in Confederate
notes. The planter delivered sixty-six of the promised bales, which the
purchaser, probably a cotton broker with contacts outside the Confeder-
acy, was able to resell for $8,717 in United States currency. The
remaining thirty-four bales were burned without fault of either party,
and to cover the value of the undel ivered bales, the planter executed and
delivered to the broker her note for $1,000. Since the note was payable
in United States currency, Latham v. Clark did not apply. The court
nevertheless ruled the promissory note unenforceable, reasoning that the
original transaction was void for illegality, the planter had received
120. 26 Ark. I (December Term 1870).
121. 26 Ark. 160 (December Term 1870).
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nothing for her cotton, and the note issued for the undelivered cotton
was void for want of consideration.
The third case decided at the December 1870 term demonstrated
that the court would set aside an executed contract involving payment
with Confederate money when there was evidence of duress coupled
with prejudice to an innocent third party.'22 In 1858 Thompson had sold
lands to Freeman for $3,840, which Freeman promised to pay in three
annual installments of $1,280 each. After Freeman made the first
installment payment, Thompson died, and letters of administration were
granted to Thompson's widow and a man named Bunyard. Freeman
made no attempt to pay the debt until the summer of 1863, when he
offered to pay the balance due in Confederate notes then worth about ten
cents on the dollar. When both the widow and Bunyard refused
payment, Freeman put pressure on both to accept Confederate money.
The county sheriff was induced to bring his influence to bear on
Thompson, described in the opinion as "a woman of weak mind."' 3
Bunyard, who was hiding from armed patrols that were scouring the
country seeking soldiers for the Confederate Army, was vulnerable to
a different type of coercion. Freeman sought out Bunyard where he was
hiding in the "brush" and persuaded him that he could avoid conscrip-
tion by executing a deed to the lands in exchange for Confederate
money. Both the widow and Bunyard eventually accepted the Confed-
erate money and executed a deed to Freeman. After the war the heirs of
Thompson sued Freeman, and Justice Harrison, then sitting on the
circuit bench, ruled in favor of the heirs. He canceled the deed and gave
Freeman a credit often cents on the dollar for the Confederate money
paid. On appeal the supreme court affirmed the lower court's decree.
The court conceded that it would be reluctant to rescue the widow and
Bunyan if they had deeded away their own property from "ignorance
and cowardice," but it refused to "wink" at a transaction that defrauded
the heirs of the estate.'24 The court did not address the propriety of
allowing a credit for the Confederate money paid by Freeman since that
issue was not raised by the heirs. If the heirs had raised the issue on
appeal, the reasoning ofLatham v. Clarkwould presumably have dictated
no credit for payment in an illegal currency.
At the June 1871 term, the court decided Booker v. Robbins.
25
There, the debtor had delivered a note payable in dollars to pay for a
122. See Freeman v. Reagan, 26 Ark. 373 (December Term 1870).
123. See id. at 376.
124. 26 Ark. at 380.
125. 26 Ark. 660 (June Term 1871).
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horse. The payee of the note later assigned it to another in exchange for
Confederate money. The court ruled that receiving illegal consideration
in the form of Confederate money for the assignment did not affect the
validity of the underlying promissory note. Since the debtor had
originally received value for his promise to pay, the result was consis-
tent with George v. Terry.
At the same term, the court answered a question left open by
Latham v. Clark. A contract calling for payment in Confederate money
was void for illegality, but was parol evidence admissible to show that
the parties intended for payment to be made in Confederate money?
Leach v. Smith had struck down the Confederate money act, which
arguably restored the holding of Roane v. Green barring the introduction
of parol evidence. Waymack v. Heilman'26 was an action to foreclose an
1864 mortgage on lands in Pulaski County. The debtor's defense was
that the mortgage secured a debt of $500 payable in Confederate dollars,
but the only evidence as to the medium of payment was testimony that
the holder of the debt had attempted to assign it for $250 in United
States currency after claiming that it was payable in Confederate money.
Without mentioning Roane the court ruled that parol evidence could be
used to show a failure or absence of consideration for a promise to pay
money. Although it termed the evidence weak, it upheld the chancel-
lor's factual determination that the parties executed the mortgage to
secure the payment of Confederate money, and this meant that the
mortgage was void under Latham.
The use of Confederate money was also an issue in Cooksey v.
McCrery,'" decided at the December term 1871. Cooksey had pur-
chased property from Williamson and agreed to pay the state a $200
debt incurred by Williamson when he acquired the property from the
state. Williamson died in February of 1863, and the administrators of
his estate were forced to pay the debt due the state. After the war,
McCrery was appointed successor administrator of Williamson's estate
and brought suit against Cooksey for his failure to pay the debt.
Cooksey argued that when the debt became due, it was in the hands of
a government in rebellion against the United States. Alternatively, he
argued that the estate had paid the debt in Confederate money and hence
gained control of the debt contrary to public policy. The court ruled
against the estate, citing, without explanation, Latham v. Clark,28 Penn
126. 26 Ark. 449 (June Term 1871).
127. 27 Ark. 303 (December Term 1871).
128. 25 Ark. 574 (December Term 1869).
[Vol. 23
POST-CIVIL WAR SUPREME COURT
v. Tollison,'29 and Booker v. Robbins 3° The court's apparent reasoning
was that while the mere acquisition of the debt from the state in
exchange for Confederate money did not affect Cooksey's liability, the
acquisition of the debt from a government in rebellion was sufficient to
tip the scales against enforcement of the liability.
Carllee v. Carlton,'3' which the court heard in June of 1872, was a
suit for specific performance of an 1864 contract to convey land. At the
time of sale the purchaser made a down payment in Confederate notes
and "Missouri State money," and agreed to pay the balance of the
purchase price in "current money of the State of Arkansas." The fact
that the contract referred to money issued by the Confederate state
government was sufficient to bring it within the rule that contracts in
consideration of Confederate money were void, and the supreme court
refused to enforce the contract.
Danley v. Crawl'32 came down at the December 1872 term. Danley
held a mortgage on three lots in Little Rock. He retained the law firm
of Pope & Newton to foreclose the mortgage. Both Pope and Newton
left Little Rock after placing the case in the hands of another attorney,
Pleasant Jordan, without the knowledge and consent of Danley. Jordan
accepted payment in Confederate money of the debt secured by the
mortgage. After the war ended, Danley brought a new action to
foreclose mortgage, and the court held that the payment of Confederate
money to Jordan was not binding on Danley. The case was not really
about Confederate money, since the court indicated it would have
reached the same result regardless of the kind of money used to pay
Jordan because Danley had never authorized Jordan to act as his agent.
The final Confederate money case considered by the court was
Tucker v. Homer. '33 The defendant had drawn a draft on a New Orleans
bank in 1862 to purchase Confederate war bonds issued by the state of
Arkansas. In a recent case out of the Eastern District of Arkansas, the
United States Supreme Court had refused to enforce a promissory note
129. 26 Ark. 545 (June Term 1871).
130. 26 Ark. 660 (June Term 1871).
131. 27 Ark. 379 (June Term 1872).
132. 28 Ark. 95 (December Term 1872).
133. 28 Ark. 335 (December Term 1873).
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delivered in payment for Arkansas war bonds," and the Arkansas
Supreme Court followed suit in Tucker v. Homer.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Another war related issue that surfaced frequently during the
postwar years was the effect of the war on the statute of limitations.
Arkansas law required that a suit to collect a debt be brought within five
years after the cause of action accrued.'" During the war most lower
courts in the state ceased to function, making it impossible for creditors
to file suits within the statutory period. In December of 1862 the
General Assembly responded to the breakdown in the judicial system
with a statute providing that all suits then pending or thereafter filed in
any court of the state were automatically continued until after the
ratification of peace between the United States and the Confederate
States. 136 In Burt v. Williams,"" the Confederate state supreme court
declared the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that as applied to
criminal cases, it denied the defendant a speedy trial, 38 and as applied
to civil cases, it impaired the validity of contracts. 39
A. Conservative Court
After hostilities ended in the spring of 1865 and the lower courts
reopened, creditors began filing suits to collect debts otherwise barred
by the five year statute of limitations. The position of the Conservative
court on the statute of limitations question was announced in Bennett v.
Worthington,"' which was an appeal from suit filed in 1866 in Chicot
County Circuit Court to collect two promissory notes, one due in March
134. See Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439 (1872). The United States
Supreme Court distinguished its earlier decision in Thorington v. Smith, discussed supra
at note 116, upholding an otherwise legal contract payable in Confederate money,
noting that persons in Confederate territory were obliged to accept Confederate money
but were not obliged to buy Confederate bonds.
135. See DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, ch. 106, § 15 (Josiah Gould ed.,
1858).
136. See Act Approved December 1, 1862, by the 14th Ark. General Assembly, Acts
Passed at the 14th Session of the General Assembly of Arkansas 72-73 (first published
by Statute Law Book Co., 1896) (hereinafter "Acts of the 14th Ark. General
Assembly").
137. 24 Ark. 91 (June Term 1863).
138. See ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. I1,§ I.
139. See id., art. 11,§ 18.
140. 24 Ark. 487 (December Term 1866).
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of 1860 and the second due in January of 186 1. The debtor pleaded that
the creditor had not brought the action within five years after the cause
of action accrued, and the creditor replied that he was unable to bring
the action within the statutory period because the Chicot County Circuit
Court was closed from October 1861 until October 1865. The supreme
court sided with the debtor and refused to toll the running of the statute
during the period that the courts were closed. It noted that the creditor
did not fall within the categories exempted by prewar legislation from
the running of the statute, and, citing English precedent, concluded "that
where the will of the legislature is clearly expressed, the courts should
adhere to the literal expression of the enactment, without regard to
consequences, and that every construction derived from a consideration
of its reason and spirit should be discarded.''
Dictum in the opinion did offer some relief to creditors. An act
passed by the Confederate General Assembly in December of 1862
suspended the statute of limitations on the collection of all debts. 42 The
Bennett court declared that the act was valid and that the statute of
limitations on collection of debts was suspended from December 1,
1862, when the legislation was approved, until March 14, 1864, when
the legislation was voided by the adoption of the Constitution of 1864.
The effect was to add about fifteen months to the five year limitations
period otherwise applicable to the collection of debts. Coming, as it did,
almost two years after the end of the war, the extension probably
afforded limited relief to most creditors.
At its June 1867 term the Conservative court refused again to toll
the statute of limitations during the war. Denton v. Brownlee, Homer &
Co. 43 was a debt collection action in the Carroll County Circuit Court
on a promissory note payable on September 30, 1860. When the
defendant pled the statute of limitations, the creditor offered an
ingenious circumvention of Bennett v. Worthington. The prewar
legislation that established the five year statute of limitations tolled the
running of the limitations period "[i]f any person, by leaving the county,
absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act of his
own, prevent[ed] the commencement of any action.'" The creditor in
Denton argued that by engaging in rebellion and war against the
government of the United States, the debtor had by an improper act
14 1. See Bennett, 24 Ark at 494.
142. See Act Approved November 21, 1862, by the 14th Ark. General Assembly,
Acts of 14th Ark. General Assembly, supra note 136, at 72.
143. 24 Ark. 556 (June Term 1867).
144. DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARK., supra note 135, ch. 106, § 32.
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prevented the commencement of an action to collect the debt. 4 ' in
rejecting the argument, the Conservative court cited another provision
of the prewar statute of limitations which stated that the statute was
tolled only if a disability existed at the time a cause of action arose. The
debtor was not engaged in rebellion when the cause of action arose in
September of 1860, and consequently any subsequent acts by the debtor
did not stop the running of the limitations period.
During its final term in December of 1867, the Conservative court
did permit a seller of land to enforce a seller's lien more than six years
after the date of sale.'" The case was distinguishable, however, from
Bennett v. Worthington and Denton v. Brownlee, Homer & Co. since an
action to enforce a seller's lien was equitable in character, and a court
of equity did not insist on strict compliance with the statute of limita-
tions.
The Conservative court handed down one other decision that, while
it did not specifically deal with the statute of limitations, did affect
actions to collect wartime debts. In May of 1864, the Unionist General
Assembly had approved draconian legislation designed to punish
creditors who supported the Confederacy:
[A]ny person hereafter aiding or abetting the rebellion, or that has or
shall hereafter violate his oath of allegiance, and all persons who are
now in arms, and all rebels in prison by Federal authorities, and all
persons who have abandoned their homes, and have fled, and have
taken protection under the so-called Southern Confederacy, shall be
forever banned from the collection of their debts in this State, of any
description whatsoever, and all courts havingjurisdiction in this State
are hereby required to dismiss said suits whenever such proof is made
at the plaintiff's cost. 47
In Vernon v. Henson,' s the Conservative supreme court ruled that the
statute impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of the United
States Constitution. According to the court, the legislature could alter
the remedy for breach of a contract, but it could not do away completely
with all remedies for such breach. By striking down the statute, the
supreme court opened the legal system to those creditors who continued
to back the Confederacy following the formation of the Unionist
government.
145. See Denton, 24 Ark. at 558-59.
146. See Atkins v. Rison, 25 Ark. 138 (December Term 1867).
147. Act 14 of the 15th Ark, General Assembly; 1864-65 Ark. Acts 45-46.
148. 24 Ark. 242 (December Term 1866).
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B. Republican Court
The Republican justices who assumed the bench in July of 1868
ultimately took a different stance on the effect of the war on the statute
of limitations. The first case involving the effect of the war on debt
collections to reach the Republican court did not directly deal with the
statute of limitations. Pillow v. Brown,'49 which was decided during the
December 1870 term of court, involved a suit to recover $109,206 for
the sale of eighty-five slaves in Tennessee on December 28, 1860. The
seller, Pointer, retained a security interest in the slaves, and the
purchaser, Pillow, also gave the seller a mortgage on plantations located
in Phillips County, Arkansas. In September of 1865, well within the
five year limitations period, the executors of Pointer's estate attempted
to foreclose the mortgages on the Arkansas property. Pillow argued that
interest should not accrue on the debt during the war because throughout
the period of hostilities he was an officer in the Confederate Army who
resided within Confederate lines while Pointer lived within Federal
lines.' The chancellor decreed a foreclosure but abated the interest that
had accrued during the war. The supreme court agreed that interest
could not be recovered on debts between alien enemies during a period
of war but noted that this rule did not apply where there was a known
agent appointed to receive the money residing within the samejurisdic-
tion as the debtor. The burden was on the debtor to show that the
exception did not apply-i.e., the debtor had to offer evidence that he
had attempted to pay the debt but was prevented by the war. Since
Pillow had failed to offer any evidence on this point, the court affirmed
the foreclosure decree but without the abatement of interest ordered by
the chancery court.
The Republican court first considered the wartime tolling of the
statute of limitations in McCreary v. State,' which was an action brought
by the state to foreclose lands securing bonds issued by the state and
sold by the defunct Real Estate Bank. The bonds fell due in October of
1861, but the state did not file suit until 1867. The owner of the lands
argued inter alia that the state of Arkansas did not exist in 1867 when
the suit was brought. His line of reasoning was apparently based on the
149. 26 Ark. 240 (December Term 1870).
150. Pillow also argued that the contract was unenforceable, but since the sale took
place well before the Emancipation Proclamation the court summarily applied Jacoway
v. Denton, discussed infra in the text at note 176.
151. 27 Ark. 425 (JuneTerm 1872).
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suggestion in Kelley discussed above"2 that no state government existed
from secession in May of 1861 until the adoption of the Constitution of
1868 in March of 1868. The supreme court refused to address the
argument, stating simply that the argument needed no comment. The
landowner also argued that the suit was barred because the state waited
from 1861 to 1867 to file the suit. The court gave this argument short
shrift, noting that a six year delay was not unreasonable considering the
state was in rebellion during most of that time.
The Republican court formally overruled Bennett v. Worthington in
Metropolitan National Bank of New York City v. Gordon.'53 In March of
1872 the New York bank brought an action to collect a written promise
to pay dated April 16, 1860, and due ten months after that date.'54 The
debtor argued that the collection was barred by the statute of limitations.
The bank countered by seeking to exclude the period from 1861 to 1865
when the courts of the state were closed. As an enemy alien the bank
had an even stronger case than the creditor in Bennett. Under the
Sequestration Act passed by the Confederate Congress, the bank's debt
was confiscated by the Confederate government in 1861,15 and the bank
could not have brought an action to collect the debt even if the courts of
Arkansas had been open. The opinion in Metropolitan National Bank of
New York City did not, however, attempt to distinguish Bennett. Instead,
it directly overruled the Conservative court decision, and relying on a
series of recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving suits
in federal court,"5 held that the war tolled the running of the limitations
period. The Republican court even endorsed the dubious argument that
a contrary rule might encourage citizens to rebel against the national
government so as to close their courts until the statute of limitations had
run.157
152. See text supra at note 71.
153. 28 Ark. 115 (December Term 1872).
154. The opinion does not explain why the five year statute of limitations did not
apply even assuming the exclusion of the period the courts were closed. It may be that
the promise was incorporated into a writing under seal, which had a ten year statute of
limitations. See DIGESTOFThE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, supra note 135, ch. 106, § 15.
155. The Confederate sequestration act of August 30, 186 1, is reprinted in OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 22, at ser. IV, vol. 1, at 586.
156. See The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871); Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. (I I
Wall.) 244 (1870); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 493 (1870); Hanger v. Abbott,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532 (1867).
157. The Republican court followed the Metropolitan National Bank case in Eddins
v. Graddy, 28 Ark. 500 (December Term 1873). See also the dictum in Jones v. Johnson,
28 Ark. 211 (December Term 1873).
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Hall v. Denckla,'" decided in the following year, established the
exact period that the statute of limitations was tolled. The court ruled
that the war began on May 6, 186 1, the day that the Arkansas conven-
tion adopted the ordinance of secession, and ended on April 2, 1866, the
date that President Johnson declared hostilities in Arkansas ended.'59
The supreme court conceded that some Arkansas courts were open
before April 2, 1866, but concluded that these courts operated under
martial law and that no litigant should be compelled to file important
documents with a court that could be closed at any time by a "corporal
with a squad of soldiers."'"
V. COLLECTIBILITY OF DEBTS RELATED TO SALE OF SLAVES
The transformation of one fourth of the state's population from the
status of slave to that of citizen spawned numerous legal questions. 6'
One such issue was the collectibility of debts for the sale of slaves.
Prior to emancipation it was a common practice for the purchaser to
defer payment of the purchase price of slaves. Instead of paying cash
for a slave, the purchaser either delivered a promissory note to the seller
or contracted to pay for the slave at a future date. Many of these notes
and contracts had not been fully paid at the time of emancipation. When
a seller sued on the promissory note or contract, the purchaser argued
that emancipation excused payment.
A. Conservative Court
The Conservative court first considered a slave related debt in
Dorris v. Grace,'62 which it handed down during the December 1866
term. On August 29, 1863, Dorris had purchased a slave from Grace by
delivering to Grace a promissory note for $3,000 plus interest at ten
percent. After the war, Grace brought suit on the note. According to
prewar precedent the purchaser of a slave assumed the risk that the slave
might die or escape. If the seller had good title to the slave at the time
of sale and passed that title to the purchaser, then the seller was entitled
158. 28 Ark. 506 (December Term 1873).
159. See Exec. Proclamation No. I (April 2, 1866), reprinted in 14 Stat. 811 (1865-
67).
160. See Hall, 28 Ark. at 512.
161. According to the 1860 census, blacks made up 26 % of the state's 435,000
inhabitants. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1870, at 3-5, Table I (1872).
162. 24 Ark. 326 (December Term 1866).
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to enforce a promise to pay for the slave. In one extreme case, the
purchaser of a slave was killed by the slave, and the slave executed for
the crime; the court nevertheless held the dead owner's estate liable for
the purchase price of the slave.163 Dorris' attorney was obviously aware
of this line of cases because he did not argue that the emancipation of
slaves subsequent to the sale constituted a failure of consideration that
extingusihed his client's obligation to pay the promissory note. Instead,
he contended that the note was void ab initio because the slave had been
freed prior to the sale by the Emancipation Proclamation issued by
President Lincoln on January 1, 1863.
The supreme court ruled that the promissory note was enforceable.
The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Walker, termed the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation a war measure, issued in the president's capacity as
commander-in-chief of United States armed forces. As such, it was
effective only to the limits of federal military power and did not apply
to slaves in territory controlled by the Confederacy. Since, on August
29, 1863, the "enemy," as Walker somewhat tactlessly put it, had not yet
extended its lines to include Pine Bluff, where the sale took place, Grace
received good title to the slave and was obligated to pay the promissory
note. Even if the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was not
limited to areas under federal control, the opinion questioned whether
the property interest of slave owners, which had long been recognized
by the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court,
could be divested by mere presidential proclamation. The court
followed its Dorris holding in two other cases decided during the same
term-Rust v. Reives ". and Ex parte Millwee' 65-both involving sales of
slaves in areas still under Confederate control.
The result in these three cases can be contrasted with that reached
in Steele v. Richardson,'66 which was also decided during the December
1866 term of court. On April 14, 1865, Steele, who apparently was
woefully ignorant of current affairs, conveyed to Richardson a 435-acre
farm in Ouachita County valued at $10,000 in exchange for six slaves.
When Steele belatedly discovered that the Constitution of 1864 had
abolished slavery over a year before the exchange, he sued Richardson
to recover the farm. Although Richardson knew at the time of the
exchange that he lacked any property interest in the slaves, he contended
that Steele should not recover the farm because ignorance of the law-
163. See Abraham v. Gray, 14 Ark. 301 (July Term 1853).
164. 24 Ark. 359 (December Term 1866).
165. 24 Ark. 364 (December Term 1866).
166. 24 Ark. 365 (December Term 1866).
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i.e., the abolition of slavery-was no excuse. The conservative court
ruled that Steele was entitled to have the deed to the farm cancelled
because he had received no consideration whatsoever for his transfer of
a $10,000 farm. The decision is easily reconciled with Dorris and the
other cases in which the subjects of the sale were still slaves at the time
of the sale. The decision is also consistent with antebellum decisions
permitting the purchaser of a slave to recover the purchase price of a
slave who had been legally emancipated prior to sale.
67
The Conservative court heard three more slave cases during the
December 1867 term. It was customary for a seller of a slave to warrant
to the purchaser that the slave was a slave for life. In Haskill v. Sevier 6
a purchaser of slaves argued that the warranty of lifetime servitude was
breached by the abolition of slavery. The court held that the warranties
made by the seller applied to the condition of the slaves at the time of
sale, not their future condition. The warranty that a slave was sound in
mind and body did not promise that the slave would not later become
insane or ill, and by the same token, a warranty of servitude for life was
not a guarantee that the slave would never be freed.
The facts of Willis v. Halliburton69 are somewhat muddled.
Apparently, the seller conveyed title to several slaves to a buyer in
exchange for a promise to pay $6,000. A third party who claimed title
to the slaves then sued the buyer, but before the adverse claim could be
decided by the courts, the slaves were freed. The buyer then refused to
pay for the slaves alleging fraud and breach of the warranty of title by
the seller. With very little discussion, the supreme court ruled against
the buyer. The decision is explained in large part by the absence of any
evidence in the record as to who actually owned the slaves at the time
of sale.
In Atkins v. Busby,"7 ° the third case decided at the December 1867
term, the Conservative court drew a distinction between executed and
executory contracts for the sale of slaves. Busby sold slaves to Atkins
in 1859, but Busby retained both title and possession of the slaves until
Atkins made the first of several installment payments. Since Atkins
167. In Strayhorn v. Giles, 22 Ark. 517 (January Term 1861), the seller's agent
executed a bill of sale warranting that a particular slave was a slave for life despite the
agent's knowledge of rumors that the slave was free. When the slave subsequently
obtained a judgment of emancipation, the purchaser successfully brought an action
against the agent for fraud.
168. 25 Ark. 152 (December Term 1867).
169. 25 Ark. 173 (December Term 1867).
170. 25 Ark. 176 (December Term 1867). This may be the same note at issue in
Busby v. Atkins discussed supra in the text accompanying note 106.
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failed to make the first installment payment, title to the slaves never
passed to Atkins, and Busby continued to bear the risk of loss due to
emancipation.
B. Republican Court
The Constitution of 1868 attempted to overturn the rule of Dorris
v. Grace regarding the enforceability of contracts for the sale of slaves
by declaring:
All contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves are null and void, and
no court of this State shall take cognizance of any suit founded on
such contracts; nor shall any amount ever be collected or recovered
on any judgment or decree which shall have been, or which may be,
rendered on account of any such contract or obligation on any pretext,
legal or otherwise. "'
Despite this clear constitutional admonition, the Republican court that
took office in July of 1868 ducked the enforceability question in the first
three cases to reach it.
Johnson v. Walker,'" which came before the court at its first term in
December of 1868, was an attempt by the purchaser to set aside the
March 1863 conveyance of a plantation complete with slaves and farm
implements. The Republican court refused to rescind the contract
because the purchaser had not offered to return a large amount of
personal property conveyed by the seller. On the question of whether
the seller had title to the slaves at the time of conveyance, the court
noted cryptically that the purchaser had full knowledge of any defects
in title that might result from emancipation.
A second case considered during the December 1868 term, Coolidge
v. Burnes,'" was a suit to collect on a bill of exchange 74 drawn on the
defendants and accepted by them prior to the war. The defendants tried
to escape liability on the grounds thatthe bill of exchange had originally
been drawn by a third party to pay for slaves who were subsequently
freed. The supreme court managed to avoid addressing the effect of
emancipation on the validity of the bills of exchange. Since the
defendants were not the purchasers of the slaves, they lost nothing when
171. See ARK. CONST. Of 1868, art. XV. § 14.
172. 25 Ark. 196 (December Term 1868).
173. 25 Ark. 241 (December Term 1868).
174. The contemporary term for a bill of exchange is "draft." See U.C.C. § 3-104,
cmt. 4 (1995).
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the slaves were emancipated and were hardly in a position to complain
about failure of consideration.
Six months later, in Russellv. Shute,17 the court strained even harder
to avoid the constitutional prohibition on enforcing slave contracts. In
June of 1866, Shute obtained ajudgment against Russell on a note given
for the purchase of a slave. When Russell failed to pay the judgment,
Shute secured ajudgment on a bond posted by Cage as security for the
judgment against Russell. The supreme court refused to enjoin the
collection of Shute'sjudgment on the bond. The constitution barred the
collection ofjudgments for the purchase of slaves, but, according to the
court, the forfeiture of the bond extinguished the judgment for the
purchase of the slave, and hence the judgment no longer existed when
the Constitution of 1868 took effect. Shute was attempting to collect the
judgment on the bond, which was entirely separate from the underlying
judgment for the purchase of slaves. The court raised, but found it
unnecessary to consider, the "grave question" whether the Arkansas
constitution's prohibition on enforcing slave contracts conflicted with
the United States Constitution.
It was impossible for the Republican court to avoid the constitu-
tional prohibition on enforcement of contracts for the sale of slaves in
the December 1869 case of Jacoway v. Denton,"7 6 which was a straight-
forward action to collect $4,500 for three slaves sold on October 4,
1861. According to three justices--Gregg, Wilshire, and Harri-
son-slavery was legal under the laws of Arkansas and the United
States at the time the contract was entered. Consequently, any attempt
by the state to deny the buyer the right to recover the purchase price
impaired the validity of a lawful contract contrary to Article I, section
10, of the United States Constitution." The majority also accepted the
rule laid down by the Conservative court in Dorris v. Grace that the
emancipation of slaves in Arkansas occurred as areas of the state came
under Union control. The opinion rejected, however, the suggestion in
Dorris that President Lincoln lacked the power to free slaves by
executive proclamation, concluding instead that: "All property of
rebels, captured by the army, as soon as secure, became vested in the
Government; and, when brought within her military lines, she could,
with the utmost propriety, liberate slaves."'
1
175. 25 Ark. 469 (June Term 1869).
176. 25 Ark. 625 (December Term 1869), appeal dismissed, 154 U.S. 583 (1872).
177. Two years later the United States Supreme Court would reach the same
conclusion. See White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1871).
178. See Jacoway, 25 Ark. at 629.
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Bowen and McClure, the two members of the court who had served
as delegates to the constitutional convention of 1868, dissented. The
supreme court reporter states that Bowen dissented on the grounds that
it was against public policy to enforce contracts for the sale of slaves.
Unfortunately, his opinion does not appear in the official report of the
case. McClure's lengthy dissent was printed in the report. It focused
narrowly on the second clause of the 1868 constitution which states that
no court of this state shall take cognizance of a suit to enforce a contract
for the sale or purchase of slaves. The constitution that creates a court
can also define its jurisdiction, and McClure interpreted the second
clause as denying the supreme court, as well as all inferior Arkansas
courts, the jurisdiction to enforce contracts for the sale or purchase of
slaves. According to McClure, barring access to the Arkansas courts did
not impair the validity of such contracts because they were still
enforceable in the federal courts, which were not subject to the
jurisdictional limitation imposed on the state courts.
At its December 1870 term, in Kaufman & Co. v. Barb,'" the court
considered an attempt to collect for the sale of a slave in Independence
County on July 10, 1863. Since there was no allegation in the pleadings
that Independence County was within Union lines on July 10, 1863, the
court adhered to rule ofDorris v. Grace and reversed ajudgment denying
recovery of the purchase price. McClure dissented on the grounds that
the pleadings did sufficiently allege the occupation of Independence
County by United States forces at the time of the sale.
The Republican court heard three other cases during the December
1870 term,'" and one case during the June 1871 term,'8 ' involving
contracts for the sale of slaves that were clearly legal at the time they
were made. The court concluded that all four cases were controlled by
the holding in Jacoway v. Denton and summarily disposed of the cases.
McClure continued to dissent in several of these cases on the
grounds that the Constitution of 1868 barred the court from considering
cases involving the sale of slaves. His opinion in Pillow v. Brown,"2 was
particularly vehement. The majority invoked Jacoway v. Denton without
discussion. McClure conceded that closing the courts of Arkansas to
Arkansas citizens seeking to enforce slave contracts might impair the
179. 26 Ark. 24 (December Term 1870).
180. See Buchanan v. Nixon, 26 Ark. 47 (December Term 1870); Pillow v. Brown,
26 Ark. 240 (December Term 1870); Sevier v. Haskell, 26 Ark. 133 (December Term
1870).
181. See Knott v. Knott, 26 Ark. 444 (June Term 1871).
182. The facts of the case are discussed supra at note 149.
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validity of contracts, but he refused to extend the holding to a contract
entered in another state between citizens of that state.
The Republican court heard its last slave sale case at the June 1873
term. 8 ' In Anderson v. Mills'" the purchaser attempted to shift the risk
of emancipation back to the seller by arguing that title to the slaves
remained in the seller until the purchaser paid the purchase price, or
alternatively, that title to the slaves reverted to the seller when the
purchaser failed to pay the purchase price. The court rejected both
arguments since the evidence clearly indicated that the seller had
transferred both title and possession of the slaves to the purchaser and
had made no attempt to foreclose his chattel mortgage on the slaves
when the purchaser defaulted. McClure was still dissenting, as was
Justice Bennett, who had joined the court after its decision in Jacoway
v. Denton.
Both the Conservative court and the Republican court agreed that
contracts for sale of slaves entered after January 1, 1863, the date of the
Emancipation Proclamation, were enforceable unless the sale took place
in an area controlled by Union forces.' Neither court was ever called
upon to consider the effect of the Constitution of 1864 on contracts for
the sale of slaves. Article V of that document specifically abolished
slavery in Arkansas. Since both courts accepted the prospective validity
of that constitution throughout the state, including areas still under
Confederate control, both courts would have presumably refused to
enforce any contract for the-sale of slaves entered after March 14, 1864,
the effective date of the new constitution, regardless of which side
controlled the area in which the sale took place. It was not until 1886,
however, over ten years after the end of reconstruction, that the supreme
court confirmed that the adoption of the Constitution freed all slaves in
the state. 18
183. The court did hear several appeals involving the enforceability of notes
delivered for the purchase of plantations complete with slaves, but it managed to
resolve all these cases without reaching the emancipation issue. See Campbell v.
Rankin, 28 Ark. 401 (December Term 1873); Richardson v. Thomas, 28 Ark. 387
(December Term 1873); Sheppard v. Thomas, 26 Ark. 617 (June Term 1871).
184. 28 Ark. 175 (June Term 1873). The opinion was authored by former
Confederate Chief Justice Elbert if. English, who was sitting as a special justice in
place of Justice Stephenson.
185. The Republican court in Jacoway v. Denton reached the same result as the
Conservative court in Dorris v. Grace-Arkansas slaves became free as they came under
the control of the United States government.
186. See Graves v. Pinchback, 47 Ark. 470 (1886).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
On most questions produced by the Civil War the positions of the
Conservative court of 1866-67 stood in sharp contrast to those of the
Republican court of 1868-74.
I. The Conservative court decided that all acts of the Confederate
state government were valid except to the extent they directly conflicted
with the United States Constitution. The Republican court declared that
no government existed in the state between the date of secession and the
adoption of the Constitution of 1864.
2. The Conservative court never considered a contract or note
specifically payable in Confederate money, but it did reject all attempts
to show by parol evidence that the parties contemplated payment in
Confederate money. The Republican court proclaimed promises to pay
Confederate money unenforceable because the parties aided and abetted
a rebellion against the United States government.
3. The Conservative court refused to toll the running of the statute
of limitations during the waryears. The Republican court suspended the
statute from the date of secession to the end of hostilities in the state.
4. The two courts agreed only on the question of payment for
slaves. So long as slavery was still legal at the time and place of sale,
a postwar court would enforce the obligation to pay for a slave. The
Republican court reached this last conclusion despite a clear constitu-
tional dictate to the contrary.
All jurists are to some degree prisoners of their own political and
economic experience, and the men who served on the Arkansas
Supreme Court during the decade following the Civil War were no
exception. Justices on both courts had experienced the trauma of the
Civil War though from different sides. It is hardly surprising that
victors and vanquished did not always agree on the appropriate response
to the legal issues produced by the war.
The justices who sat on the Conservative supreme court came from
the politico-economic class that led Arkansas to war, and their reaction
to the defeat of the Confederacy was typical of that class. Secession had
failed and slavery had ended, but the war changed little else. The goal
of the former Confederates who swept into office in the August 1866
elections was to minimize the war's impact on the state and restore the
status quo antebellum.
The Conservative dominated General Assembly that met in the
winter of 1866-67 reflected this attitude. It passed a statute that denied
402 [Vol. 23
POST-CIVIL WAR SUPREME COURT
many basic civil rights to newly freed slaves.8 It enacted draconian
labor laws that made virtual peons of farm workers.88 It set aside ten
percent of all state revenues to provide disability benefits for Confeder-
ate, but not Union, veterans. 9 Finally, and most significantly, it
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.90
The Conservative supreme court likewise attempted to minimize
the impact of the war, but unlike the General Assembly, which could
take a proactive approach toward restoring the prewar situation, the
court could act only through the cases that came before it. The best
illustration of the supreme court's efforts to minimize the war was its
treatment of the legal effect of secession. Despite attempts by the
Unionist authors of the Constitution of 1864 to invalidate all actions of
the Confederate state government, the Conservative court upheld all
actions taken by the Confederate state government and its courts except
those directly contrary to the United States Constitution.
In cases involving Confederate money or the statute of limitations,
minimizing the war meant ignoring the conflict's extraordinary
character and relying woodenly on stare decisis even when prewar
precedent was poorly equipped to answer the problems created by the
war. How else can one explain the Conservative court's refusal to
permit evidence that the parties to a contract intended payment to be
made in Confederate dollars or its insistence that the statute of limita-
tions continued to run despite the complete breakdown of the judicial
system?
In only one area did the Conservative court's adherence to prewar
precedent provide a workable solution to the legal problems faced after
the war. Antebellum law involving slaves dictated that the purchaser
assumed the risk that a slave would escape or die following the transfer
of title, and the court quite properly extended this precedent to cover
emancipation by government edict.
While the Conservative court tended to minimize the effect of the
Civil War, the Republican court seemed determined to drive home to
former Confederates the enormity of their unsuccessful attempt to
187. Act 35 of the 16th Ark. General Assembly, 1866-67 Ark. Acts 98. Although
the act granted persons of African descent the right to own property, make contracts,
and give evidence, it specifically declined to modify any statute, law or "usuage" that
prohibited intermarriage with whites, voting in elections, serving on juries, or joining
the militia.
188. Act 122 of the 16th Ark. General Assembly, 1866-67 Ark. Acts 298.
189. Act 31 of the 16th Ark. General Assembly, 1866-67 Ark. Acts 90. The
benefits were not available to persons "otherwise provided for by the United States."
190. ARK. HOUSE JOURNAL 289-91 (1866-67).
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withdraw from the Union. This attitude was not immediately apparent
following the July 1868 takeover of the court. During their first few
years on the bench, the Republican justices were slow to disturb the
decisions of the Conservative court. The decision in Latham v. Clark
declaring void all contracts and notes payable in Confederate money
was handed down during the December 1869 term. It was not until the
spring of 1871, almost three years after the Republican court took the
bench, that it issued Penn v. Tollison, which invalidated all actions of the
Confederate state government. Metropolitan National Bank of New York
City v. Gordon, which tolled the statute of limitations during the war
years, came down during the December 1872 term.
The court's gradual denunciation of anything remotely related to
the Confederacy coincided with the radicalization of the Arkansas
Republican party. Not long after the Republican victory in the 1868
election, the coalition of newcomers and native Unionists who formed
the backbone of the party started to unravel. Although most newcomers
continued to support Governor Powell Clayton, who had come to
Arkansas during the war as a Union officer, native Unionists rallied
around Lieutenant Governor James M. Johnson, a longtime resident of
Madison County in northwest Arkansas. In early 1871 Clayton
announced his intention to resign the governor's seat to seek election to
the United States Senate. This provoked a fight over his successor that
largely pitted newcomers against native Unionists. The gubernatorial
succession confrontation ended with the lieutenant governor's resigna-
tion and Clayton's election to the senate, but the rift created between the
two factions of the party proved slow to heal. Native unionists began
to stray from the Republican fold which came more and more to be
dominated by Clayton and other newcomers.19
On the supreme court itself newcomers Bennett, Searle, and
Stephenson replaced Bowen, Wilshire, and Harrison. Of the three
justices who left the court, only Bowen had a reputation as a Republican
hardliner. Harrison was a native Unionist who would be elected to the
court as a Democrat after the end of reconstruction.'92 Wilshire was a
newcomer, but he was not a "radical" as evidenced by his election to
Congress as a Conservative following the 1874 Republican downfall.'93
By the end of 1872, the sole native Unionist left on the court was Gregg.
Unlike Wilshire and Harrison, however, Gregg remained a loyal
191. See MICHAEL B. DOUGAN, ARKANSAS ODYSSEY 256-58 (1994).
192. See HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 12, at 45 1.
193. Id.
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Republican. After leaving the court in 1874, he never again held public
office, although he did run for governor as a Republican in 1886.' So
long as the newcomer faction was aligned with long term residents of
the state, the Republican supreme court was probably reluctant to
invalidate contracts payable in Confederate money or the wartime
actions of the Confederate state government and its courts. After all,
many native Unionists, despite their loyalties, either personally used
both Confederate money and the Confederate state court system, or at
the very least appreciated the wartime predicament faced by Arkansans.
The best barometer of Unionist sentiment on the court was William
H. Harrison, the longtime resident of Chicot County in the Arkansas
delta. Harrison vigorously dissented in Latham v. Clark, the decision that
invalidated all contracts for payment in Confederate money, and in Penn
v. Tollison, the decision that voided all acts of the Confederate state
government.
Lafayette Gregg, the other native Unionist on the court, occupied
a position somewhere between Harrison and the more radical Republi-
can members of the court. Gregg did vote with the majority in Latham
v. Clark, but unlike Harrison, Gregg was from Washington County,
which was occupied by Union forces in the first year of the war, and
Gregg spent most of the war years in areas where Confederate dollars
were not a medium of exchange and Confederate courts did not operate.
Gregg also voted with the majority in Penn v. Tollison, but his authorship
of the decision in Thompson v. Mankin, which reads like a concurring
opinion in Penn v. Tollison, may indicate his lack of enthusiasm for some
of the more extreme statements in Penn v. Tollison.
Political events at the national level may also have influenced the
Republican justices. The position of the Conservative court mirrored
that of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, as well as most former
Confederates-the defeat of the Confederate States had confirmed that
a state could not withdraw from the Union. If Arkansas' attempt to
leave the Union was a void act, then the wartime government of
Arkansas continued to exist until replaced by a loyalist government
recognized by the president. The Republican court, on the other hand,
accepted the theory underlying Congressional reconstruction. The
former Confederate states ceased to be members of the Union and did
not again become states until they satisfied Congressional conditions for
readmission.
194. See id.
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Economic considerations may have also played a role in the
Republican court's decisions. During the early 1870s the Republican
leaders of Arkansas actively sought to attract investment in the state's
economy. Unfortunately, Arkansas had a less than favorable reputation
with northern investors thanks to the ill-fated Real Estate Bank and
similar prewar attempts to raise capital.' 5 The Republican court was not
unaware of the need to burnish the state's good name in the eyes of
northern creditors, and this may have played a role in several of the
court's decisions. Except for a few unpatriotic souls who were not
adverse to dealing with the enemy, northern banks and merchants did
not extend credit to Arkansans during the war and were therefore
unlikely to hold debts denominated in Confederate dollars. The
Republican court could safely repudiate all wartime debts owed those
creditors who had agreed to accept payment in Confederate dollars
without discouraging the investment of new capital in the state.
Continuing to run the statute of limitations during the war years, on the
other hand, did pose problems for northern creditors. They would not
have been able to collect the debts during the war years, and allowing
Arkansans to invoke the statute of limitations would have cut off many
prewar debts owed northern creditors. It was probably not coincidental
that the case in which the Republican court choose to overrule the
Conservative court and toll the statute of limitations during the war
years involved a major New York bank. The decision came down
during the same time period that Arkansas was attempting to sell
various public improvement bonds to New York investors, and the
justices may have taken into account the reaction of potential investors.
It is also significant that Metropolitan National Bank of New York City
v. Gordon was decided after Penn v. Tollison. So long as the status of the
Confederate state government and its courts remained uncertain, the
Republican court struggled with whether to toll the limitations period
during the war. Once, however, the court decided that no legal
government, and hence no legal courts, existed in the state following
secession, it became much easier to toll the limitations period.
In contrast to questions involving the legal effect of secession, the
enforceability of promises topay Confederate money, and the tolling of
the statute of limitations, contracts for the purchase of slaves did not
prove divisive during the postwar period. The Republican justices
195. A brief description of the default on the Real Estate Bank bonds and
subsequent Republican efforts to rehabilitate the state's credit are described in Garland
E. Bayliss, Post-Reconstruction Repudiation: Evil Blot or Financial Necessity, 23 ARK.
HIST. Q. 243, 243-44 (1964).
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followed the precedent laid down by their Conservative predecessors.
This lack of disagreement, despite the different backgrounds of the
justices, is explained by the absence of a clear political or economic
agenda in the slave cases. The slave contract cases did not require a
court to take a position on the morality of slavery or the wisdom of its
abolition. The only issue was which of two former slave owners-the
seller or the buyer-should bear the economic loss resulting from
emancipation. The Conservative court followed prewar precedent
which assigned to the buyer the risk that a slave would die or escape
after title passed, and there was no political reason or economic
incentive for the Republican court to change that result.

